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PREFACE
Among recent trends in Thomistic studies a growing interest
in St. Thomas' Platonic and neo-Platonic characteristics is eviArthur Little's The Platonic Heritage of Thomism l is a good

dent.

example of just such a study.

The principal doctrine attributed

to St. Thomas' Platonic bent is that of participation.

In recent

years ·two second editions of notable works on st. Thomas' theory
of participation have appeared.

First, there is L.-B Geiger's

La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin 2 and

/

then there is Cornelio Fabro's La Nozione Metafisica

d~

Partecipa-

zione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino. 3
The study of this doctrine of participation in the works of
St. Thomas leads to the posing of several questions, chief among
which might be couched in these terms:

was St. Thomas of Aquinas

a Platonic Aristotelian or an Aristotelian Platonist?
words:
nist?

Or in other

was St. Thomas fundamentally an Aristotelian or a PlatoThose who would answer with the latter make much of St.

Thomas' doctrine of participation.
To attempt an answer to this question within the scope of a
Master's thesis would be extremely presumptuous.

lDublin, 1949.
2Second edition, Paris, 1953.
3Second edition. Rome, 1950.

A definitive

~

vii
answer could be given only after years of careful study and research, and

p~rhaps

not even then.

The author of this thesis would like to investigate one section of this larger problem and has endeavored to present St. Thom
as' doctrine on the participation of creatures in good.

This is

certainly a limited subject, but it is felt that an exposition in
English of St. Thomas' theory of how creatures participate in good
will contribute something toward the study of st. Thomas' doctrine
of participation in general and maybe

~

accidens throw a little

light on the historical side of the question.

For participation

in good is one of the principal types of participation and one of
the more Platonic aspects of the doctrine itself.
There have been several studies of St. Thomas' doctrine on
good.

A rather well worked-out treatment of the Thomistic philos-

ophyof the metaphysical good is contained in Sister Enid's dissertation for the Catholic University of America, The Goodness of
Being in Thomistic Philosophy and Its Contemporary Significance. 4
Another treatment of St. Thomas' philosophy of the good is Elizabeth G. Salmon's The Good in Existential Metaphysics. 5

Since it

is the Aquinas Lecture for 1952 at Marquette University, this work
has the limitation of being restricted to a paper of an hour's
reading.
Neither the current studies of St. Thomas' metaphysics of the

4Sister Enid Smith, O.S.B., Washington, D.C., 1947.
5

aukee

1953.

•i

viii
good nor the works on participation go into the subject of participation in g?od to any length or detail.

A wedding of the two

doctrines--an exposition of the Thomistic doctrine of participatio
in good--is the aim of this thesis.
This study is not historical but expository.

It does not at-

tempt to state what the heritage of St. Thomas was nor to place
him in one philosophical camp or another on the basis of doctrinal
leanings.

This thesis merely ambitions the presentation of St.

Thomas' doctrine of

p~rticipation

in good, of what Thomas said on

the subject and not what his sayings on the subject make of him.
This study suffers a notable omission which could be treated
quite legitimately within the confines of the subject matter, that
is, the epistemological side of the question.

Most of the aspects

of the question pertaining to the theory of knowledge have been omitted entirely; a few have been touched upon cursorily.

Both

the omission and the terse treatment of these important aspects of
the problem are due to the necessary limitations of a paper of
this scope.
The procedure

call~

for by this thesis entails working from

those texts of the works of St. Thomas that deal directly with the
subject.

On the question of the good this is Question 21 of the

Quaestiones Disputatae

d~

Veritate, the Question de Bono.

This

section of the De Veritate forms the basis for the treatment of
the metaphysics of the good because it is the longest and most developed treatise of St. Thomas on the subject.
V ritate ranks with the Summa Theolo iae and

Furthermore, the

ix
Gentiles as one of the major works of St. Thomas.

As Etienne Gil-

son puts it, "the Quaestiones de Veritate • • • are no less indispensable to know than the two Summas for the person who would penetrate to the very depths of St. Thomas' thought.,,6

Vernon Bourke

states, moreover, that "most of the basic principles and conclusions of Thomistic wisdom are thoroughly developed in this earliest

and longest group of disputed questions.,,7
It should be noted here that the treatment of St. Thomas' doc-

trine on the good is limited to the metaphysical good and bypasses
or merely touches upon the Thomistic teaching on the moral and
.v

/

psychological goods •
The principal text to be consulted in the matter of participation is from the second chapter or lesson of the In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus Expositio.

Unlike the question of the good,

the subject of partiCipation is not treated at length in the works
of St. Thomas.

Consequently, the text from the De .Hebdomadibus

forms the basis of the study, while other texts from the works of
St. Thomas will be consulted to interpret, extend, and amplify
what is said in the Commentary

££ Boethius' De Hebdomadibus.

Throughout the entire study no text promising to be helpful will
be neglected.
The metaphysics of the good will be treated first, and then

6Etienne Gilson, La Philosophie Au Moyen Age (Paris, 1947),
pp. 527-28.
7Vernon J. Bourke, "Introduction" to Truth (Chicago, 1952),
I. xxvi.

x
St. Thomas' doctrine on participation in general.

Lastly, the

doctrine of the participation of creatures in good will be considered.

This arrangement has been selected because it is felt that

the notions of partiCipation and of good must be clarified before
the doctrine of participation in good can be expounded.
To a large extent, quotations from the works of St. Thomas
that occur in the body of the text of this study are given in English with the original Latin in the footnote.
standarq translations have been used:

For the most part,

for the Quaestiones Dispu-

tatae de Veritate, Truth~ for the Summa Contra Gentiles, the Dominican Translationj9 for most of the Summa Theologiae cited in this
/

study, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas; 10 where that was not
possible, the Dominican Translation ll of that work was used. Where
other translations have been employed, they will be cited in the
proper places.

Where a translation is given and no translator is

mentioned, the translation is that of the author of this thesis.

8Translated from the definitive Leonine text by Robert W.
Mulligan, S.J.j James V. McGlyrul, S.J.j and Robert W. Schmidt, S.J.
(Chicago, 1952-1954).
9Translated by the English Dominican Fathers, 5 vols. (London, 1924-1929).
lOTranslated into Englishj edited and annotated, with an introduction, by Anton C. Pegis, 2 vols. (New York, 1945).
llTranslated by. the English Dominican F'athers. It'irst Americar:
edition, 3 vols. (New York, 1947-1948). When a citation from this
Iwork is ai ven it wi 11 be oreceded bv the initials D. T.

C~T~

I

THE DOCTRINE OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
ON THE METAPHYSICAL GOOD
In order to understand St. Thomas' theory on participation in
good, it will be necessary first to understand precisely what is
contained in the notion of good, in which creatures participate.
In the twenty-first question of the Quaestiones Disputatae

/

Veritate, the Quaestio de

~,

importance and interest:

(1) the relation of the notion of good

~

there are three topics of special

to that of being, (2) the order of the transcendentals, and (3) the
question of participation in good.

All six of the articles of this
question fall under one or other of these topics. l Since the last
topic of these three, that of participation, will be treated in the
final chapter of this study, after the general ideas on participation have been examined, this

chapter will be concerned with the

relation between good and being and the order of the transcendentals.
As for the first of the two topics to be considered 1n this
chapter, that of the relation of good to being, St. Thomas and

lThe sixth article introduces an Augustinian question not
directly on the point of this study; hence it will not be treated
here. The question is: Does the Good of a Creature Consist in
Measure, Species, and Order as Augustine Says?

all philosophers are faced with a problem.

When a man says that

something 1s good, it would seem that he is adding something to
that thing; an addition to being, however, seems impossible because the universal concept of being contains all things within
it.

"For every reality is essentially a being."2
St. Thomas starts his close metaphysical analysis of tbe re-

lationship obtaining between being and good by an enumeration of
the ways in wh1ch one th1ng can be added to another:
can be added to sometb1ng else in three ways.

"Someth1ng

(1) It adds some

reality wbich is outside the essence of the thing to which it is
said to be added.

For instance, white adds something to body,

since the essence of whiteness is something beyond that of body."3
Of the three, modes of addit10n, the first is rea11zed when one
th1ng is added to another; and the addendum is outs1de the essence
of that to which it is added.

This kind of addition takes place

when white is added to man, for it is not of the essence of man
that he be white.
Another mode of addition is had by contraction or determina-

2De Veritate, 1, 1 c: "Q,uaelibet natura essentialiter est
ens" ~anctl Thomae Aquinatis Q,uaestiones Disputatae, vol. It
De Veri tate, ed. Raymundus Splazzl, O.p. [Rome, 1949J, p. 2 b}.
The translation is from Truth, vol. I, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago, 1952), p. 5.
3~ Ver., 21, 1 c: "Tripliciter potest aliqu1d super alterum
addere. Uno modo quod addat aliquam rem quae sit extra essentiam
illius rer-cur-Qrcitur addi; sicut album addit super corpus, quia
assentia albed1n1s est praeter essentiam corporis." The translation is from Truth, vol. III, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, S.J.
(Ch1cago, 1954), p. 5.

:3

tion.

This happens when the notion of man is added to animal.

Previous to. the addition of man, animal contains the notion of
man implicitly or potentially.

Man contracts and determines the

notion of animal, giving it the formal qualities of a man.
Alio modo dicitur aliquid addi super alterum per
modum contrahendi et determinandij sicut homo addit aliquid super animal: non quldem ita quod sit in homine
allqua res quae sit penltus extra essentiam animalis,
alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo
esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominisj sed animal
per hominem contrahltur, quia id quod determinate et
actuallter continetur in ratione hOminis, impllclte et
quasi potentiallter continetur in ratione anlmalis. 8icut est de ratione hominis quod habeat animam rationalem, et de ratione animalis est quod habeat animam, non
determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalemj ista tamen determinatio ratione cuius homo super animal addere
dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur. 4
It should be noted that in this type of addition there is a real
foundation for the determination or contraction.

Although the

genus animal is capable of being rational or irrational, in the
actual

composit~

there is an existing reality that makes it the

one and not the othero
The third and last type of addition is made in thought alone.
What is added by the second notion is only a conceptual note which
is not found in the notion of the first.

For example, the adjec-

tive blind adds something to the notion of man, namely, blindness;
but blindness is only a conceptual being and not a natural one,
because it is a privation.

Nonetheless, blindness contracts the

notion of man because not every man is blind.

When we speak of a

4

blind mole, however, we do not determine our notion of mole in any
way, because. every mole is blind.
Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum
secundum rationem tantum; ~ando scilicet aliquid est
de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius: quod
tamen nihil est in rerUIn natura, sed in ratione tantum,
sive per illud contrahatur id cui dicitur addi, sive
non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scilicet
caecitatem, quae non est aliquod ens in natura, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis
homo caecus est; sed cum dicitur talpam caecam, non fit
per hoc additum aliqua contractio. 5
It does not make any difference, then, whether the conceptual addition contracts or determines the being to which it is added.
What characterizes this third type of addition is that it is made
/

by thought alone.
After describing these three types of addition, St. Thomas
proceeds to see what kind is employed when the note of goodness
is added to being.

It is clear that good is not added to being

in the first way.

In fact, nothing can be added to the universal

concept of being according to the first manner of addition; for
this type of addition requires that the addendum be outside the
essence of that to which it is added, and there is nothing that
exists or has any reference to existence outside the essence of
transcendental being.

nIt is not possible • • • for something to

add anything to being in general in the first· way, though in that
way there can be an addition to some particular sort of being; for

5
·~

there is no real being which is outside the essence of being in
general, though some reality may be outside the essence of
being. ".6

~

As Thomas points out, something can be outside the com-

prehension of this or that particular being; but nothing can be
outside the all-embracing concept of being taken in the transcendental sense. 7
As for the second kind of addition, that of contraction and
determination, there are many things which can be added to the
transcendental concept of being according to it.

All of the ten

categories are added in this way; for each of the ten categories
or predicaments adds a determined mode of existence to the notion
/

of being:

substance adds the mode of being in itself; accident,

that of being in another; relation, that of being referred to another; and so forth.

Good, however, cannot be added in this way:

Secundo autem modo inveniuntur ali qua addere super
ens, quIa ens contrahltur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non aliquod aCCidens,

6Ibid.:

"Non autem potest esse quod super ens universale
aliquid lrimo ~, quamvis illo modo posslt tIeri
aliqua additio super a iquod ens particulare; nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essent1am entis universalis, quamvis
aliqua rest sit extra essent1am :ibulus entis." It 1s clear that
in this passage universalis as applied to being means transcendental, a term commonly used by the later scholastics. Universalis could not mean univocal here.
aliqui~dat

7In 1, 1 c. of the same work, Aquinas says the same thing:
"Sed enti non potest addi ali quid quasi extranea natura, per modum
quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens." Nothing can be added to being as though 'it were extraneous to_being, for every nature is
essentially a being.

6

vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis,
sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa essentia rei.
Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens: cum
bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut patet in
I Ethlcor.: et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super
ens, vel ai addat, quod sit in ratione tantum. 8
As St. Thomas has already indicated, good is a mode that follows
upon every being;9 and, as Aristotle says,lO the good is equally
divided among the ten categories of being.

Therefore, good can-

not be a determined mode of being.
By this process of exclusion, it becomes evident that, it
good adds anything to being, it must do so according to the third
type of addition, which is by concept alone.

Now good does add

something to being because men do not call a thing good for no
reason at all.

Therefore, since every conceptual addition is ei-

ther a negation or a certain kind ot relation and good is not a
negative but a positive notion, it must be that good adds some
kind of a relation to being.
Si enim adderetur aliquid reale, oporteret quod
per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale
genus. Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in concep-

aDe Var., 21, 1 c. In the same work, 1, 1 c, the relation
of the-Categories to being is explained: "Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatls, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et
iuxta hos modos accipiuntur divaraa rerum genera. Substantia enim
non addit supra ens aliquam differentlam, quae slgnificat aliquam
naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprim1tur quidam specialis modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in
allis generibus."
9~., 1,

i

c.

l~icomachean
Ethics., I, 5, 1096 a, 19-30.
J

~

l~

~I

~

7

tione mentis •• '. , oportet quod omne illud nomen vel
sit synonymum enti:. quod de bono diei non potest, eum
non nugatorie dieatur ens bonumj vel addat aliquid ad
minus seoundum l'ationemj et sio oportet quod bonum, ex
quo non eontrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod
sit rationis tantum.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Sic ergo supra ens • • • unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, soilicet negationem: dioitur enim unum
quasi ens indivisum. Sed verum et bonum positive dieunturj unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit
rationis tantumo ll
'
Of the three proper accidents or properties that are consequent on
every being, one or oneness adds a negative note, that of indivisibility.

Since true and good are positive notions, they must add

a relation which is of the reason alone.
The nature of this merely rational or conceptual relation,
which will be referred to as a
study, remains to be clarified.

~-~

relation hereafter in this

Something is related to another

thing in a non-real sense, says Thomas quoting Aristotle, when it
is not really dependent upon that to which it is related; but, on
the contrary, that to which it is related is really dependent upon
it.12:

Such is the relation existing between knowledge and the

thing known:
Illa autem relatio • • • dicitur esse rationis tantum,
secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad
id ad quod refertur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relat10
quaedam dependentia sit, sicut patet in scientia et sci~
bili, sensu et sensibili. Scientia en1m dependet a scibili, sed non e converso: unde relatio qua scientla refertur ad sclbile, est realis; relatl0 vero qua sclbile

llIbid.

-

l2Metaphysics,

r ,

15, 1021 a, 27.

8

refertur ad sCientiam, est rationis tantum: dicitur enim scibile referri • • • non quia ipsum referatur, sed
quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Et ita est in omnibus
aliis "quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile. 13

·I

The thing known is related to knowledge in a non-real sense because in no way is the thing known actually dependent upon knowledge; but knowledge is really dependent upon the thing known,
and from this point of view there is a real relation between the
two.
St. Thomas goes on to say that in this way the true and the
good add the merely rational or conceptual note of
,/
;'

fects to the notion of being.

~

which

~

"The true and the good must there-

fore add to the concept of being, a relationship of that which
perfects. 1t14 Elsewhere, speaking of the three major transcendentals, one, true, and good, St. Thomas says,

"But none of these

adds any difference that limits being, but a quality that follows
upon every being; just as the one adds the quality of indivisibility, and the good the quality of finality, and the true the quality of ordination to knowledge. M15 Here Aquinas is careful to pOint
13De Ver., 21, 1 c. For the same doctrine see ~.T., I, 13,
7 c; III; 35; 5, ad 3; In I Sent., 30, 1, 1, ad 2; De Yot., 7, 8,
ad 1; 7, 11, ad 1. In S.!.,-r;-13, 7, ad 6 St. Thomas gives this
norm for seeing whether the relations are mutually real or not:
"Si enim unum in sui inte11ectu c1audat aliud et e oonverso, tunc
sunt simu1 natura. • •• Si autem unum in sui intellectu c1audat
aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul natura. Et hoc modo
se habent scientia at scibi1e."
bonum

l4De Var., 21, 1 c (III, 6): "Oportet 19ltur quod verum et
super-rnte1l~ctum entis addant respectum perfectlvl."

-

9

out that the three transcendentals do not determine being in any
way but add, each of them, a formalityt

indivisibility by the

one, finality by the good, and ordination to cognition by the true~
Although both the true and the good add a note of
~erfects

~

which

to being according to their respective formalities, there

is a distinction not only between the kind of perfection added but
also in the mode in which each one adds to being.

In every being

there is a specific character and there is existence.,

According-

ly, one being can perfect another in two ways.
In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare: scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid
allud subsls~lt In specIe ll1a;-er-sIc allquod ens potest esse perfectlvum dupliclter.
Uno,modo secundum ratlonem speciel tantum•. Et sic
ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perflcltur per ratlonem entis. Nec tamen ens est ln eo secundum esse naturale; et ldeo hunc modum perflclendl addlt verum super
ens. Verum enim est ln mente • • • ; et unumquodque ens
ln tantum dlcitur verum, in quantum conformatum est vel
conformabile lntellectui. 16
The flrst way, then, that one belng can perfect another ls ln the
11ne of the spec1flc character of the perfectlng belng, as happens
when the lntellect is perfected by an object outslde ltself.

For,

ln cognltlon, the belng known does not exlst ln the 1ntellect according to lts natural existence; but its specles or speclfic
character exists there intent10nally.

quam d1fferentlam contrahentem ens, sed rat10nem quae consequltur
omne ens; sicut unum add1t rat10nem lndlvlslonls, et bonum ratlone
flnls, et verum ratlonem ordln1s adrf0gnltlonem·' (Scrlptum Super
L1bros Sententlarum, ed. Mandonnet L!'arls, 1929], I, 488).,
16!2!.

Y.!!:.,

21, 1 c.

10
The second mode of perfecting another is that which is accomplished in poth the specific character and the existence.
in this way that the good perfects being.

It is

uA being is perfective

of another not only according to its specific character but also
according to the existence which it has in reality.

In this fash-

ion the good is perfective; for the good is in things, as the
Philosopher says."17

Thus the good perfects another being not

only acoording to the specific character of good but alao according to ita own existence; and, for this reason, the good is said
to be present in things.
It is noteworthy that St. Thomas refers to the addition the
good makes to being as a ratio and not a natura.

"Bonum, verum et

unum addunt super ens, non quidem naturam aliquam, 'sed rationem."18
Natura here is taken in the sense of an essence existing in reality; ratio, as a formal aspect or formality of something also existing in reality.

The point that Thomas wants to make is that

the good does not add another entity to being; indeed, as Aquinas
has already said,19 this would be impossible.

What the concept of

good does is to point to some aspect or facet of being that is not

l7Ibid., (III, 7), HAlio modo ens est perfectivum alterius
non solum-Becundum rationem speCIer, sed etiam secundum esse quod
habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum.
Bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philo8ophus dicit in VI Metaphys."
The exact place in The Metaphysics is E, 4, 1027 b, 25-26.
18!a I ~., 8, 1, 3 c.
19See De Ver., 1, 1 c and 21, 1 c; for a discussion of this
same point seepp., 4 and 5 above.
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understood specifically by the concept being taken in.itself.
What, then, is the content of the concept good?

St. Thomas

answers that since the good thing completes and perfects another
thing, it takes on an aspect of finality toward that which it perfects.

"Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is

suoh as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other
as an end.

And hence it is that all who rightly define good put

in its notion something about its status as an end.

The Philoso-

pher accordingly says that they excellently defined good who said
that it is 'that which all things desire.,lt20
,,/

I

The concept of good,

then, inasmuch as it perfects and completes the being which tends
toward it, is a final cause or end for that being.
In this first article of the twenty-first question of the De
Veri tate , St. Thomas distinguishes two types of good.

The first

type, holding the highest position on the scale of goods, is that
which perfects another as an end.

Another type of good, called

useful by the Angelic Doctor, is that which leads to an end or na.

20De Ver., 21, 1 c (III, 7): "In quantum autem unum ens est
secundum-esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum, habet
rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficiturj et inde est
quod omnes recte definientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid
quod pertineat ad habitudinem finis; unde Philosophps dicit in I
Ethicorum, quod bonum optime definiunt dicentes, quod bonum est
quod omnia appetunt." As given in the text above, Truth, Which is
a translation of the Leonine Manuscript, translates the phrase
"In quantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservati'vum"' (emphasis added) by "Inasmuch as one being by reason of Its act of existing is such ~s to perfect and COmplete another," which would indicate that the Leonine Text readSsomething other than conservativum here, possibly completivum or,
better, consummativum. In any case, it will be taken to mean
complete in the. English sense.

-l~

turally follows upon an end; this type of being is called good in
either a causal or significative sense.

nFirst of all and princi-

pally • • • a being capable of perfecting another after the manner
of an end is called good; but seQondari1y something is called good
which leads to an end (as the useful is said to be good), or which
naturally follows upon an end (as not only that which has health
is called healthy, but also anything which causes, preserves, or
signifies health) ._2.1

To these two categories of good, St. Thomas

adds a third type, the pleasurable. 22..

He defines the pleasurable
good as that which quiets or brings rest to a desire. 23
What is the relation of these three types of good among themselves?

St. Thomas tells us that the honorable good and the

pleasurable good are goods in themselves inasmuch as they contain
the aspect of true finality or end in itself and are not subordinated to some other end as the useful good is.

nThe useful good

is ordained to the pleasurable and to the honorable as to an end;
and thus there are two principal goods, the honorable, namely, and

2..11bid .: "Sic ergo primo et principaliter dicitur ens bonum
perfectlvum alterius per modum finis; sed secundario dicitur aliquid bonum, quod est ductivum in finem: prout utile dicitur bonum,
vel natum est consequi finem."
22See De Ver., 22, 15 Cj 24, 1, ad 11; and 24, 6 c for places
where ThomaS-mentions all three types of good.
23 1n the Summa Theologiae, I, 5, 6 c, St. Thomas defines the
pleasurable good thus: wId autem quod terminat motum appetitus ut
quies in re desiderata, est delectation; and in the same work,
II-II, 145, 3 c, he says, ItDelectabile_autem dicitur inquantum
quietat appetitum." This note of satisfaction of a desire seems
to characterize the pleasurable good.
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the pleasurable. n24

The honorable good and the pleasurable seem

to be good- in the proper sense, while the useful is called good as
though by an analogy of attribution.
A more precise alignment of the three goods places the pleasurable good beneath the honorable because the pleasurable good is
not always in accord with reason and con8.equently is not always a
moral good, whereas the honorable good and the useful good are always in accord with reason and therefore morally gOOd. 25

For this;

reason the pleasurable good is subordinated to the honorable.
"Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal
)

which is predicated equa.lly of them all, but as something analogi ...
cal which is predicated of them according to priority and posteriority.

For it i8 predicated ch1efly of the honorable, then of the
pleasant, and lastly of the useful. n26 The good, then, is predicated first of all of the honorable good, secondly of the pleasurable, and lastly of the useful.
24De Malo I, 4~ ad 12; Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Marietti ed:-(Rome: 1942}, II, 18. See De Ver., 24, ~ c;ror-tne same
doctrine.
25 S.T., I-II, 34, 2, ad 1; see also I, 5, 6, ad 2.

2:6Ibid., I, 5, 6, ad 3: '''Bonum non d1vid1tur 1n ieta tria
sicut unIVOcum aequaliter de his praedicatum; sed sicut analogum,
quod praedicatur secundum prius et posterius. Per prius enim
praedicatur de honesto; et secundario de delectabili; tertio de
utili." (Saneti Thomae Aguinatis Summa Theolog1ae, with Leonine
text, e. P. Caramello L1ur1n, 1950J, I, 2~ b.) The translation
is from The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (a revision at
the English Dominican transIition), e. Anton
Pegis (New York,
1945), I, 50..,

c.

1:4

In the second article of Question 21 of the De Veri tate St.
Thomas takes up the question of whether good and being are interchangeable in their real subjects. 27

Aquinas' teaching on the

good requires that good and being be identical in real, existing,
concrete beings, or, as they are called, supposites.
St. Thomas argues in the following way.

Since the nature of

good consists in the ability of one thing to perfect another thlng
as. an end, everything that has the notion of end has the notion of
good. 28

There are, moreover, two aspects of the notion of end;

(1) it is desired by those things which do not as yet possess it;
and (2) lt is relished and delighted in by those things which are
already in possession of it.
essentlal to an end:

As Thomas puts it:

-Two things are

it must be sought or desired by things which

have not yet attained the end, and it must be loved by the things
which share the end, and be, as it were, enjoyable to them.

For

it is essentially the same to tend to an end and in some sense to
repose in that end."29

2,7De Vera 21, 2 c:
dum supposlta.'

With this point established, the next

"utrum ens et bonum convertantur secun-

2BSee S.T~, I, 19, 1, ad 1; 49, 1 c; I-II, 72, 1, ad 1; 94,
2 c; II-II,-44, 1 c; where Thomas says that an end has the formal
aspect of good. In De Ver., 21, 2 c he says, "Cum ratio boni in
hoc consistat quod aIrquld sit perfectlvum alterius per modum
finls, orone ld quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet et rationem boni.1I
2.9De Ve~., 21, 2 c (III, 10): -Duo • • • sunt de ratione finis; ut-ScIIicet sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem
nondum attingunt, aut sit dilectum, et quasi delectabile, ab his
quae finem participant: cum eiusdem rationis sit tendere in finem

e+:

"nfinA auadammonoouiescel"s."
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question is:

are these two formalities found in being?

That these two aspects of goodness are verified in being is
proved in the following way:

(1) those things which do not have

existence, tend to it as prime matter tends toward form; and (2)
all things which have existence naturally love their existence and
conserve it with all their strength.

Therefore, all things are

good, either by tending toward existence which they do not have
or by enjoying the existence they already have.

"For whatever

does not yet participate in the aot of being tends toward it by a
certain natural appetite.
cording to the Philosopher.

In this way matter tends to form, acBut everything which already has be-

ing naturally loves its being and with all its strength preserves
it. tt30
It is in the sense of the good's being applied to prime mat.
ter that the good is said to have a larger extension than being.
"Accordingly matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because
it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being:

and yet this suffices for it to be called a good ab-

solutely, on account of this very order.
1n a sense, extends further than being. n3l

This shows that the good
In the De Veritate,

30Ib1d • (III, 11): "Quae enim nondum esse participant, in
esse quodam naturali appetitu tenduntj unde et materia appetit for
mam, secundum Philosophum in I. Phys. Omnia autem quae iam esse
habent, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsum tota virtute
conservant." The reference to The Physics of Aristotle is I, 9,
192 a, 22. 31e.G., III, 20: "Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici
o
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however, St. Thomas is careful to point out that good is extended
to prime matter in a causal, and not in a real or predicative,
senae.

"Good extends to non-beings not attribut1vely but causally
inasmuch'as non-beings tend to good. n32 The prime matter cannot
be said to be good in a real sense because prime matter of itself
really does not exist; but it can be said to be good in this that
it tends toward good through the final causality of goodness.
"For even non-existent things, namely matter considered as subject
to privation, seek a good, namely to exist.

Hence it follows that

matter also is good; for nothing but the good seeks the good."33
4

After stating that every existing being has one of the two

,.'

features of an end, either it tends toward being or enjoys and
conserves its own actual existence, and accordingly has the nature
of good (inasmuch as every good perfects another being as an
Aquinas concludes that every existence has the formality

o~

end},~'

good.

potest autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ipsum
ad bonum. In quo apparet quod bonum quodammodo amplioris est
ambitus quan ens" (Sancti Thomae de A2uino Summa Contra Gentiles,
Leonine manual ed. LRome, 1~3{J, p:-24 b). The translation Is
from The Summa Contra Gentiles of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. English Dominican Fathers (London,-r928), III, Part I, 40.
32De Ver., 21, 2, ad 2 (III, 11): "Bonum non se extendit ad
non entra per praedicationem, sed per causalitatem, inquantum non
entia appetunt bonum. 1t
33C.G., III, 20 (III, i, 40): "Uam et ipsa non existentia,
scilicet materia secundum quod intelligitur privationi subiecta:,
appetit bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona:
nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum."
34See above, pp. 14 and 15 in the text; also De Veri tate, 21,
2 c, where St. Thomas treats this point.
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"Existence, therefore, has the essential note of goodness.,,35

He

goes on to.say, "Just as it is impossible, then, for anything to
be a being which does not have .existence, so too it is necessary
that every being be good by the very fact of its having existence,
even though in many beings many other aspects of goodness are added over and above the act of existing by which they subsist." 36
Accordingly, just as it would be impossible to have a being that
would not have existence, so would it be necessary to say that every being by the very fact that it has existence is also good.
St. Thomas then argues for the converse of this proposition.
/

"Since • • • good includes the note of being, • • • it is impossible for anything to be good which is not a being.

Thus we are

left with the conclusion that good and being are interchangeable."
Since good includes the formality of being, there cannot be a good
that does not have being; and thus the proposition that good and
being are interchangeable is true.
In the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas has a neat proof for the
statement that every being is good.

He argues that, since every

35De Ver., 2,1, 2 c (III, 11):
tionem bonI:"'"

"Ipsum igitur esse habet ra ...

36 Ibid .:. "Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens
quod non-Eibeat esse, ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex
hoc ipso quod esse habet; quamvis et in quibusdam entibus multae
rationes bonitatis superadduntur supra suum esse quo subsistunt."
This last point will be taken up in a later chapter.
37 Ibid .:

"Cum autem bonum rationem entis includat, • • • imaliquid esse bonum quod non sit ens; et ita relinquitur quod bonum et ens convertuntur."
p08sibi~at
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existing being as such has some act, it is therefore perfect to
some extent, because all act indicates perfection.

He further ar-

gues that, since perfection has the formal aspect of being desireable in itself and of good, every being is good.
being, is good.

"Every being, as

For all being, as being, has actuality and is in

some way perfect, since every act is some sort of perfection, and
perfection implies desirability and goodness • • • •
lows that every being as such is good. n38

Hence it fol

Consequently, every be-

ing, inasmuch as it is a being, is good.
Although every good is a being and every being is good, St.
Thomas notes that the interchangeableness of these two concepts is
j

had according to the substantial goodness and substantial being of
every supposite and not according to the goodness or existence
that might be accidental to the supposite.

In fact, St. Thomas

lists accidental good as a division of being.

nA thing can be

called good both from its act of existing and frOm some added
property or state.

Thus a man is said to be good both as existing

and as being just and chaste or destined for beatitude.

By reason

of the first goodness being is interchanged with good, and conversely.

But by reason of the second, good is a division of be-

ing." 39

It is by reason of a being's substantial goodness and not

381, 5, 3 c (I, 45): "Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens, est
in actu, et quodammodo perfectum: quia omnis actus perfectio
quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni •
• • • Unde sequitur omne ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse."
39De Ver., 21, ~, ad 6 (III, 12):

":Aliquid potest dici bonum
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its accidental goodness that being and good are interchangeable.
With this interpretation or the interchangeability of goodness and being in mind, another facet of the Thomistic metaphysics
or the good can be approached, namely, the statement that "Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea."40

By this Thomas means that in the actually existing being the substantial goodness and the substantial being are one and the samej
the one cannot be had without the otherj ror, as has been proved,
every being is good and every good thing is a being.

The human

intellect regarding a being, however, discerns two formalities,
/

/

the existence and the goodness of the being.

The being of the

thing can be considered without any rererence to its goodness, but
the converse or this is not true, ror the good presupposes and includes the notion or being. 4l The good is said to add in concept
alone the formal aspect of that which perfects to the concept of
being.

As Thomas says, "goodness and being are the same really.

But goodness expresses the aspect of desirableness, which being
does not expresa.,,4a

Good expresses something about a thing that

et ex suo esse, et ex sua proprietate, vel habitudine superadditaj
sicut dicitur aliquis homo bonus et in quantum est iustus et castus, vel ordinatus ad beatitudinem. Ratione igitur primae bonitatis ens convertitur cum bono, et e converso; sed ratione secundae
bonum dividit."
rem:
,

.

.

40S• T., I, 5, 1 c (I, 42): "bonum et ens aunt idem secundum
dTfferunt secundum rationem_tantum.1t
41 In I Sent., 8, 1, 3 c.

rem:

42 S • T., I, 5, 1 c (I, 42): "bonum et ens sunt idem secundum
sed-bonum addit rationem a etib11is
uam non dicit ens."

being does not express, even though both attributes are one and
the same in the thing of which they are predicated.
This discussion of the relationship of good to being opens
the way for the second topic to be investigated in this chapter,
namely, the order or rank of the transcendentals among themselves.
The first thing to be noted is that, since they are interchangeable according to the supposite, there can be no order of
priority among the four transcendental notions of being, one,
and good from a consideration of the supposlte.

true~

Any priority of

one of these to the other must belong to the order of concepts;
and, according to this type of consideration, there can be a priority.
ways:

"If we compare them to each other, we can do this in two
either as to their. real subject and in this way they are

interchangeable with one another and are the same in the rea'l subject and never are separated; or according to their intellectual
expression, and in this way being is essentially and logically
prior to other things.

The reason for this is that being is in-

cluded in the notion of these things, whereas the opposite is not
true.

For the first thing that enters the representation of the

intellects is being, and without this nothing can be grasped by
the intellect."43

That which precedes all the others is being be-

43In I Sent., 8, 1, 3 c: "Si autem comparemus ea ad invicem,
hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum suppositumj et sic convertuntur ad invicem, et sunt idem in supposito, nec unquam derelinquunt se; vel secundum intentiones eorum; et sic simpliciter et
absolute ens est prius aliis. Cujus ratio est, quia ens includitu!
in intellectu eorum, et non e converso. Primum enim quod cadit in
ima inatione intellectus est ens sine uod sic nihil otest a -
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cause this concept
others,

whe~eas

Thomas says,

is included in the understanding of all the

the converse of this proposition is not true.

further~ore,

St.

that, since the one adds only a negation

it is the closest to being. 44

The question of priority, then,

will be concerned with the good and the true.
Aquinas starts his discussion of the priority of truth to
goodness in the De Veri tate by alluding to a double order that can
obtain among perfections. 45

The order may be considered from the

aspect of the things perfected or from the aspect of the perfections themselves.
Considered from the aspect of the things perfected, the order
existing between the true and the good yields the priority to the
good.
Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex
parte perfectibilium, sic bonum est naturaliter prius
quam verum, duplici ratione.
a) Primo, quia perfectio boni ad plura se ext endit quam perfectio veri.
A vero enim non sunt nata perfici nisi illa quae
possunt aliquod ens percipere in seipsis vel in seipsis
habere secundum suam rationem, et non secundum illud esse quod ens habet in seipso: et huiusmodi sunt solum
ea quae immaterialiter aliquid recipiunt, et sunt cognoscitivaj species enim lapidis est in anima non autem
secundum esse quod habet in lapide.

prehendi ab intellectu." Thus Mandonnet has it; Parma reads (correctly) sine quo (Vol. VI, 69 a).
44 Ibid .: "Unum addit rationemindivisionis; et propter hoc
est propinquisaimum ad ens, quid addit tantum negationem."
45De Ver., 21, 3 c: nOrdo autem inter perfectiones poteat
uno modo ex parte ipaarum perfectionum: alio
modo ex parte perfectIbrlium. u
---attendi~uprrciter:

22~

Sed a bono nata sunt pertici illa quae secundum materiale esse aliquid recipiunt: cum ratio boni in hoc
consistat quod aliquid sit pertectivum tam secundum rationem speciei quam secundum esse, ut prius dictum est •.
Et ideo omnia appetunt bonumj sed non omnia cognoscunt
verum. In utroque enim ostenditur habitudo perfectibilis ad perfectionem, quae est bonum et verumj scilicet
in appetitu boni et cognitione veri.
b) Secundo, quia illa quae nata sunt perfici bono
et vero, per prius perficiuntur bono quam vero: ex hoc
enim quod participant esse, perficiuntur bono, ut dictum
est; ex hoc autem quod cognoscunt aliquid, perficiuntur
vero. Cognitio au-tem est posterior quam essej unde et
in hac consideratione ex parte perfectibilium bonum
praecedit verum. 46
Thomas alleges two reasons for placing the good prior to the true
when considered from the viewpoint of the things perfected.

The

first reason is that the perfection of goodness is extended to
more things than the perfection of truth.

For the true can per-

fect only those beings that are endowed with an immaterial cognitive faculty, since conformity with an intellect is the nature of
truth.
ence.

All that is necessary to be perfected by the good is exist
The second reason for putting the good before the true in

this lineup is that things which are perfected by both the good
and the true are first perfected by the good.

Goodness comes fro

existence while cognition always follows upon existence.

Thus,

when these two transcendental concepts are considered from the
point of view of the things perfected, the good takes precedence
over the true.
An absolute consideration of the true and the good, that is,
a consideration of them in their own intelligibility and in them-

selves without reference to anything else, places the true before
the good. .
Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic
verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sIt perfectivum alicuius secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem
non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse
quod habet in re. Et ita plura includit in se ratio
boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illa; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum
autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione
intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile
est in quantum .est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum,
nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosoph~8 in IV Metaph.
Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talls est ordo,
si secundum se considerentur, quod post ens est unum,
deinde verum, deinde post verum bonum. 47
The reason Thomas advances, then, in the Question De Bono for the
priority of truth over goodness in the absolute order is that the
true perfects according to the essence of the perfecting being
whereas the good perfects things according to both its essence and
its existence.

Moreover, the good presupposes the true, which in

its turn presupposes the one.
This same question is treated in the Summa Theologiae. 48 Here
the good and the true are considered only as they are conceived by
the intellect, or in the absolute order.

The same doctrine is

held as in the De Veritate, but different reasons are proffered.
"For the true regards being itself absolutely and immediately,
while the nature of good follows being in so far as being 1s in

r,

47Ibid.
2,

l~,

The exact reference to Aristotle's Metaphysics is
23-32.

48I, 16, 4 c. It is interesting to note that this comparison
is made not in the section on good, but in that on the true.

r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
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some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. 1t49
two

reaso~s

The first of the

Thomas gives in this work 1s that the true is more

proximate to being that the go.od.

The true regards being 1mmed1-

ately, while the good 1n its perfective capacity is appetible and
follows upon being.

Thus, 1n the absolute order the true is prior

to the good.
The second reason given in the Summa Theologiae for. the absolute priority of truth to goodness is the follow1ng:

"Secondly,

it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes apw
pet1te.

Hence, s1nce the true is related to knowledge, and the

good to the appetite, the true must be prior in nature to the good
Since the true is concerned with cognition and the good with appetency, the true is prior to the good because cognition always
precedes appetite.
St. Thomas has more to say about the relationship between the
true and the good in his Commentarium In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Hebraeos.

In this work he says:

"Although the true and the good,

when considered absolutely, are interchangeable in their real subjects, they are none the less related to each other in a different
way inasmuch as they differ logically.

For the true 1s in a cer-

49Ibid • (I, 173): tlVerum propinqu1us se habet ad ens, quod
est priUS;-quam bonum. Naro verum respicit 1psum esse simpliciter
et immediate: ratio autem boni consequ1tur esse, secundum quod
est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est."
50Ibid. ItSecundo apparet ex hoc, quod cogniti~ naturaliter
praecedit appetitum. Unde cum verum respic1at cognitionem, bonum
autem appet1tum, prius erit verum quam bonum secundum rat1onem. 1t
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tain sense good , and the good is in a certain sense true.
the same

wa~

It is

with the intellect and will, which are distinguished

according to the distinction between the true and the good."5l
This terse opinion of St. Thomas on the subject seems to be the
best:

the two transcendentals in question have different

o~de~s

of priority according to the different viewpoints taken of them.
Now that the Thomistic metaphysics of the good has been

~e

viewed, this study can turn toward the Thomistic doctrine on participation in general to

unde~stand

better the position of St.

Thomas on participation in good.

51 In Heb., c. 11, 1ect. 1 (Parma XlII, 756 b): "Verum, autem~
at bonum, etsi in se considerata convertantur quantum ad supposita~
tamen inquantum diff'erunt ratione, diverso ordine se habent ad
invicem: quia et verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam
verum. Et similiter intellectus et voluntas, quae distinguuntur
penes distinctionem veri et boni."

CHAPTER II
THE DOCTRINE OF PARTICIPATION
AS GIVEN IN THE WORKS OF
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
Before an adequate treatment of Saint Thomas' doctrine on
participation in good can be given, an inquir7 must be made into
the Thomistic position on participation in general.

Moreover,

since this study is concerned with the transcendental notion of
good and participation therein, the aspect of participation to be
treated in this chapter will be transcendental participation.

The

other types of participation will be treated inasmuch as they are
related to transcendental participation.
The notion of participation was part and parcel of the thinking of most of St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophical forebears as well
as contemporaries. l It should not be surprising then, if it is
difficult to find a precise and exact meaning of the term partici-

lW. Norris Clarke, S.J., "The Meaning of PartiCipation in St.
Thomas," The Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical
ASBociation-TWashlngton, D7C.;-I952), p. 150. F'ather Clarke cItes
St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., D. 8, p. 2, q. 1-2; D. 43,
1-3;
also Peter John Olivi,-gllaest. In II Lib. Sent., q. 16, 'Omnis
enim forma quae non est in alia a se recepta et participata • • •
est absolutissima, universallissima, infinitissima et breviter est
suum ens et ipsemet Deus. R

a.
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pare in the works of St. Thomas. a
It shou.ld not be sur'prising that the much-used and -tossed
about term participate should have different meanings in different
contexts.

L.-B. Geiger, O.P., in his book on Thomistic participa-

tion,3 assigns various non-technical meanings to the terms partici.
pare and participatio in the works of St. Thomas. 4

Father Geiger

says that in certain passages participare could be as well rendered by habere or reciperej but, in the main, St. Thomas used the
terms participatio and participare in their technical sense. 5
What, then, was the technical meaning of participare for St.
Thomas?
./

In his Commentary

~

the

~

Hebdomadibus of Boethius, the

Angelic Doctor gives the etymological definition of participare.
"To participate," he says,"is to receive as it were a part."S

2Today, certain terms applied to the physical sciences, almost
defy definition precisely because they are used so much and are so
familiar. For example, Ernest H. Hutten, writing for The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science (May, 1955}, sayS:- nWe only
slowly work out the meaning, or meanIngs, of a technical term. In
phYSics, for example, we employ 'electron' in many different ways,
according to the theories in which the term occursj but I do not
think there is a single textbook where we could find a definition
for it." "The Methodology of Psycho-Analysis," p. 81.
3L~.B. Geiger, O.P., La Participation ~ la Philosophie de
S. Thomas d'Aquin, 2nd ed.~arIs, 1953).
4~., pp. 11 & ff.

5In the text, "Omne quod est participatum in aliquo est in eo
per modum participantis: quia nihil potest recipere ultra mensura~
suam" (In I Sent., 8, 1, a, Contra 2), Geiger says that particithie is a-synonym for recipere; and he seems justified in making
s statement. See hIs work for further examplesj pp. 11-12,
note 3; and pp. 145-146, notes 2 & 3.
6St • Thomas Aquinas, In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus Exposi-
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Taking too etymological a view of participation presents the
danger of misunderstanding the true meaning of metaphysical participation.

To receive, accept, take, or have a part of anything de-

notes the idea of a division of a whole among several recipients,
like dividing a pie among four or six people.

In the metaphysical

order, however, such a division is not possible; for act and quality are simple things.

They either are or they are not.

"If,

then, partiCipation is applied to them, this cannot mean to have a
part, since there are no parts, but to have in a particular, lim~,

imperfect wayan act and a formality which are found else-

where in a universal, unlimited, and perfect manner. 1t7
Lest his reader get the idea that metaphysical participation
might be quantitative, St. Thomas, immediately after the abovequoted phrase from the Commentary

~

Boethius, adds, "when any-

thing receives in a particular manner that which belongs to another in a total manner, it is said to participate it."S

Another

tio, lect. 2; ed. Calcaterra (Turin, 1954), s. Thomae Aquinatis
Theologica, Vol. II, 396, # 24. St7 Thomas gives the
same etymology in his· Commentary on the E1istle to the Hebrews,
!lEst autem participare, partem caperEi':"""n Episto'liiiils. Pauli
ad Hebraeos EX1ositio, C. 6, lect. 1; S. ¥Somae Aqulnatis Opera
omnIa (Parma, 852-1873), Vol. XIII, p7 715 b.

~scula

7Fabro, Cornelio, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aguino, 2nd ed. (TurIn, 1950), p. 316. "Sequindi-ad essi si-applica ~l... 'partecipare' ciO potra significare
non l'avere una parte, poiche non vi sono parti, ma l'avere in
modo 'particolare', 'limitato', 'imperfetto' un atto ed una formalita che altrove 6i trovano in modo totale illimitato e perfetto."
SIn de Hebd., lect. 2; ed. Calcaterra, p" '376: "quando aliquid partICulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter dicitur participare illud. 1I

_.

2.9

description of metaphysical participation is to be found in St.
Thomas' Commentary

~

the Heavens 2£ Aristotle, in which he says,

tlfor to participate is nothing else than to accept from another in
a partial manner. 119
In order to illustrate his doctrine on participation, St.
Thomas, in the key passage cited from the Commentary

~

the De

Hebdomadibus of Boethius, offers Bome clear examples of participation.
[H]omo dicitur participare animal, quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatemj et eadem ratione Socrates participat hOminem; similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens, et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sui ratione
communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subiectum;
et similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam,
et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causaej
puta, si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis quia
non recipit eam in ea claritate qua est in sole. 1

°

Participation, then, seems to mean a beingls partial

rec~ption

and

determination of a perfection that belongs to the participated being in a perfect or complete way.ll

9In de Caelo et Mundo, Liber II, lectio 18; ed. Spiazzi, S.
Thomae IQuInatls In~rlstotelis Libros De Caelo et Mundo, De Generatione et CorruPtions, Meteorolog1corum Exposltro (Turin;-l~),
p. 233, #463: "nam particlpare nihil aliud est quam ab a110 partialiter acc1pere. u
lOIn de ~.~ lect. 2.
llIn many other texts from the writings of St. Thomas these
fundamental notions of participation are repeated. See In ad Coloss., c.l, lect. 4 (Parma, XIII, 536 b): "Participativea11qu1d
CoiiV'eni t a110 quod excedit suam naturam sed .. tamen a11qu1d de illo
part1c1pat, sed 1mperfecte: sicut 1ntellectuale hom1ne quod est
supra rationale, et est essent1ale Angelorum, et idem a11qu1d partlclpat homo"; also In I Met., 10, n. 154 (ed. Spiazzi, 1950, 45 b}:
"Quod enlm totaliterest aITau1d. non nartic1nat illude sed est
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The main passage on Thomistic participation, that is, the
text from the second chapter of Thomas' Commentary

~

the De Reb-

domadibus, gives the three modes or types of participation.

These

are the logical, the predicamental, and the transcendental.

Al-

though St. Thomas does not call these kinds of participation by
these names, he does conceive of them as different modes of participation; and, as will be seen, the names suggested here and
used by modern authors, do fit the different modes to which they
are applied.
Further down from the selection already cited,12 Aquinas
says, "Though we pass over this third
i

~

of participation for

the moment, it is impossible for existence itself to partake of
anything according to the first two types. u13

What should be not-

ed in this quotation is not the doctrine of participation as regards subsistent existence but the fact that Thomas conceived of

per essentiam idem illl. Quod vero non totallter est allquid, habens aliau1d aliud adiunctum proprie participare dicitur"; C.G.,
I, 32: 'Omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati,
et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem perfectionis modumll; and finally, C.G., II, 52: "Quod autem competit alicul secundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis niei per modum
participationis: sicut calor allis corporlbus ab Igne. Ipsum
igitur esse competlt omnibus allls a primo agente per particlpationem quandam. Quod aut em competit alicul per partlcipatlonem,
non est substantia elus."
12In de Rebd., lect~ 2; as given above on page 29 of this
thesis.-- -- ---13 Ib1d • "Praetermisso autem hoc tertl0 modo partlclpandi,
impossiOIIe est qUOd secundum duos primos modoa-fpsum esse particlpet aliquld. 1I The underscoring is not in the origlnal text.
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three modes, types, or kinds of participation.
The three types of participation are found in the three sets
of examples given in the main text of Thomistic participation
quoted above.

The first pair of examples are given thus:

"Man

is said to participate in animal because he does not have the nature of animal in its full extension, and in the same way Socrates
participates in !!!!!!."l4

Man's participation of animal and the in-

dividual's participation of man are examples of a type of participation which may be called "logical" because these examples of
participation occur in the order of logical intentions.
All of the r,emaining examples in the passage cited from the
/

Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus concern beings in the real order
as opposed to the order of logical intentions.

The participation

of a subject in an accident and the partiCipation of matter in
form are examples of participation in the predicamental division
of the real order.

"Likewise subject participates in accident and

matter in form because the form (whether substantial or accidental), which of itself is common, is determined to this or that
subject. ltl5

This type can be called Itpredicamental participation"

because subject and accident and matter and form are to be found
l4Ib id. "fH] orno dicitur participare animal, quia non habet
rationem animal s secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione
Socrates participat hominem. 1t
l5Ibid. "Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens, et
materia-rO:rmam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de
sua ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subiectum.'

-in the nine categories or predicaments of accidental being.
The next division of the real order and of metaphysical participation refers to transcendentals and can be called "Transcen...
dental participation."

"In the same wayan effect is said to par-

ticipate in its cause, especially when it does not measure up to
the power of its cause.

Suppose, for instance, that we should sa

that the air participates in the light of the sun, because it does
not receive the light with the same brilliance that it has in the
sun."16
It should be noted that St. Thomas does not mean that all
causality is an instance of transcendental participation.

For in-

stance, when a dog generates an offspring, there is no question of
transcendental causality because both beings are of the same species.

In order to avoid giving the impression that all causality

is transcendental, Aquinas says that an effect is said to particio-.
pate in its cause "especially when it does not measure up to the
.

power of its cause.,,17

This is the case, for example, when air is

~

said to share the sun's light.

The air has the same kind of light

that the sun has, but the air does not possess the light with the
same degree of brilliance that it is present in the sun.
If the cause and the effect are of the same species, as is

16Ibid. "Similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam,
et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causae; puta, si
dicamus quod aer participat lucem soliS, quia non recipit eam in
ea claritate qua est in sole. 1t
17Ibid.
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true in the case of generation within a species, the part1pipation
is univocal or "pre.dicamental" because both beings participate in
the same kind of form.

When the cause and the effect are from

different grades of being, however, as is the case in the causality exercised by the Creator toward the creature, the participation
had by the creature is said to be analogous or transcendental.
Since this study is concerned with the participation of one
of the transcendental notions, that of the good, it will be necessary to examine closely the nature of transcendental participation
Before a treatment of this third mode of participation is presen-

,.

J

ted, however, a brief' look into logical and predicamental participation will be in order.
As has been seen, S. Thomas' first example of participation
comes from the field of logic:

uman is said to participate in

animal because he does not have the nature of animal in its full
extension, and in the same way Socrates participates in man. o18
What should be noted here is that, even though a thing can be
predicated by participation, still, if it actually belongs to the
essence of the participant, it is also predicated of it substantially.

It was Plato's opinion that something could not be predi-

cated through participation and substantially at the same timej
Thomas, however, says, "According to the opinion of Aristotle, who
held that

~

truly is what animal is (as though the essence of

18Ibid • The original Latin is given in note 14 on page 29
of the text above.
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animal did not exist apart from the specific difference of man),
nothing stands in the way of the substantial predication of something that is had through participation." 19 Aristotle, then, did
not share Plato's belief that what was predicated substantially
could not be predicated participatively also.
Plato's doctrine of sUbsistent ideas called for actually
existing universal ideas that maintained themselves apart from the
concrete singulars, the objects of sense knowledge.

These latter

were merely imitations of the universal ideas, which were more
real than the objects of sense knowledge. 20 Such a doctrine would
exclude the possibility of substantial and participative predicaj

tion at one and the same time; for what is predicated by participation is predicated of the concrete singular, and this cannot be
but an imitation of the universal idea of which the essence in
question is predicated substantially.

Aristotle, on the other

hand, held that in the predication of a genus or species the attribute had to be possessed substantially by that being of which
it is predicated if the predication were to be valid.

When man is

said to be an animal, man substantially possesses the notes of the
concept animal.

19 Ibid ., lect. 3: "Sed secundum aententiam Aristotelis, qui
posuit quod homo vere est id quod est animal, quasi essentia anima.
lis non existente praeter differentiam hominis; nihil prohibet, id
quod per participationem dicitur, substantialiter praedicari."
20See Plato's Republic, Bk. VI, 507 b; also Aristotle's Metaphysics, A, 6, 987 b.
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Aristotle could maintain this doctrine because he held that
the universal idea did not exist apart from the singulars of which
it is predicated except in the mind.

Consequently, the concrete

singular could possess the attribute essentially; man could be
said to be truly that which is contained in the concept of animal
and at the same time man could be said to participate in the universal idea of animal.

The idea of animal, then, exists formally

in the mind, while the foundation for the valid content of the
idea exists only in those beings that are the inferiors of the
genus animal.
Later on, it will be seen that participation of a perfection
and possession of that perfection in a substantial sense or by essence cannot be had in the transcendental or predicamental type of
participation.

That Thomas, however, is speaking in this passage

of logical and not real participation is abundantly clear from the
text, in which immediately before the passage.cited above 21 he
says he is referring to "another type of participation, in which
namely species participates genus.,,22

Therefore, it is seen that

predication of a perfection by participation and in a SUbstantial
sense is possible in the logical order; but such simultaneous
predication cannot be had in the real order.
In his Com.'TIentary .2!!. the Metaphysics of Aristotle, St. Thomas
i~

affact

ccr~v=cr~tes

..) 1

- In de Hebd.,
22Ibid.

~tat

le~t.

~as

oaan said above, namely, that in

3, as quoted on p. 33 or this study.
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logical participation, essential and participative predication can
be had at one and the same time; he also gives a clear example of
what he means.
Ea de quibus genus praedicatur secundum participationem
non possunt definiri per illud genus, nisi sit de essentia illius definiti. Sicut ferrum ignitum, de quo ignis per participationem praedicatur, non definitur per
ignem sicut per genus; quia ferrum non est per essentiam
suam ignis, sed participat aliquid eius. Genus autem
non praedicatur de speciebus per participationem, sed
per essentiam. Homo enim est animal essentialiter, non
solum aliquid ani~alis participans. Homo enim est quod
verum est animal. 3
When iron is said to be red-hot or fiery, it is not meant that
fire is of the essence of iron, but that the iron participates in
some of the perfection of fire.

When a man is said to be an ani-

",

mal, however, it means that man is by his own nature (that is,
essentially) an animal and that what is truly said of an animal
pertains to man.

In the case of man and animal it is not meant

that man merely participates in some of the perfections that are
found in the notion of animal; for man has all the perfections of
animal, even though these perfections are specified or determined
by man's rationality.

Man is said to have all of the notes of an-

imal because genus is not predicated of its species by participa24
tion but essentially.

23In VII Met., 3, n. 1328.
24 St • Thomas' statement here about genus being predicated essentially and not through participation seems to contradict what
has been said above about simultaneous essential and participative
predication. In the light of the following text from the Summa
Contra Gentiles (see note 25) it would seem that Thomas meant that
an attribute could be predicated essentially of something that

~',
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Another interesting text on logical participation is the fol
lowing taken from the Summa Contra Gentiles.

"Whatever is predi-

cated univocally of several things belongs by participation to
each of the things of which it is predicated:

for the species is

said to participate the genus, and the individual the species.
But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is
participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and
thus is possessed partially and not according to every mode of
perfection."25

This text highlights the participation of species

in genus and of the individual in the species that is had in univocal predication.
i

Although it omits the aspect of substantial

participation on the part of the participant, it does bring out
the fact of limitation on the part of the participating subject
by the statement that whatever possesses something by participation does not possess the thing in question in its totality of
perfection.

The reason for the omission of the point on substan-

tial participation, no doubt, is that Thomas is here talking of
the difference between univocal or predicamental predication and
transcendental predication.

Bringing in the matter of substantia

possession in logical participation would only confuse the issue.

possesses the quality by participation and in this sense the attribute is predicated not participatively but essentially.
25C.G., I, 32 (I, 77): "Orone quod de pluribus praedicatur
univoce; secundum participationem cuilibet eorum convenit de quo
praedicatur: nam species participare dicitur genus, et indivividuum speciem. De Deo autem nihil dicitur per participationem:
nam omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati, et
sic artiallter habetur et non secundum omnem erfectionls modum."

-.
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The next consideration will be that of the participation had
in the pred;camental order, which is concerned with substance and
its attributes.

It will be seen how substance participates in the

perfection of certain accidents and how matter participates in
form.

In treating predicamental participation here, the order of

St. Thomas is being followed; for Thomas mentions examples of predicamental participation in his Commentary .2!! the De Hebdomadibus
of Boethius after the examples of logical participation. 26
Predicamental or categorical participation deals directly wit
the real order and not directly with logical intentions, as is the
case with logical participation.

The substance, for example,

~,

actually participates in the perfection of the accident under consideration, white for example.
Predicamental participation is, therefore, real participation
and as such it constitutes with transcendental participation a division or mode of participation that is opposed to the logical
type.
In his Commentary

~

the Book of

~

Sentences, St. Thomas

gives a description of predicamental participation that is clearly
exemplified.

"Some things happen to be called 'alike' • • • be-

cause they participate in the same form, as two white things participate in whiteness. 1t27

In this type of participation both be ...

26S ee page 29 of this thesis.
2.7In I Sent., 48, 1, 1 sol.: IIContingi t autem aliqua dici
similia--. • :-ex eo quod participant unam formam, sicut duo albi
albedinem. II
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ings, or any number of beings for that matter, participate in the

~.

,,

same form; hence this type of participation has been called univocal participation by some (although it will continue to be referred to in this paper as predicamental).

Of course, it should

be remembered that by the same form here is meant the same type of
form, not the same numerical form.

This is an example of two sub-

stances participating in the perfection of an accident, as described in the Commentary ~ the de Hebdomadibus of Boethius. 28
After describing this univocal or predicamental participation
in the above-cited passage from the Commentary

~

the Sentences,

St. Thomas goes on to say, Itthus all similar things must be composite beings. n29

It is important to note that predicamental par-

ticipation takes place between beings that are composites, composed of matter and form, and substance and accidents.

It will be

seen that this is not true in transcendental participation, where
the participated being ,is not composite but Simple and the participatd.ng being may be simple in essence, as in an angel.
What is the nature of the form that is partiCipated in by the
composite participating being? Thomas says that it is a participated form. 30 The form is participated inasmuch as it is a con-

28 Lect • 2. This type of conformity is also described in the
De Veritate, 23, 7, ad 10: "Creatura non dicitur conformari Deo
quasi participa.nti eamdem formam quam ipsa participat."·
29In I Sent., 48, 1, 1 sol.:
esse composi tum. It

"et sic orone simile oportet

nForma • • • quae est pars compositi,
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stituent element of the essence or something added thereto.
St.

Tho~as

also tells us that the participating subject, ei-

ther the substance or the matter, is compared to the accident or
form as potency is to act. 3l
In predicamental participation, then, several beings can shar
the same attribute or form (1) fully, (2) equally, (3) and as a
part. 32

Another feature of this second type of partiCipation is

the actual existence of the participated quality only in the participating subject.

According to St. Thomas, who follows Aristot-

le in this particular, there is no substantial humanity or subsistent whiteness, as Plato would have it.

These qualities exist

only in the concrete singulars from which they are abstracted.
Therefore, as is the case with logical participation, the par
ticipated form in predicamental participation (although it has an
intentional existence "in the intellect) exists in the real order
only in those singulars which participate in it and of which it is
predicated.

31C.G., II, 53, Item: "Orone participans aliquid compara tur
ad ipsum quod participatur ut potentia ad actum. 1I St. Thomas says
the same thing in S.T., I, 75, 5, ad 4: "Orone participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius."
32These qualities are suggested by Pabro in his ~ Nozione
Metafisica (p. 319). F'abro's schema, which purports to provide a
summary of all the expressions used by St. Thomas regarding participation, adds a fourth note about predicamental partiCipators,
possession of the quality as something existing of the essence of
the thing ("sicut aliquid existens de essentia rei"). This last
characteristic would not be true of a subject's participation in
accident or of matter's participation in form. Pabro's schema,
then, seems to attribute too much to predicamental participation.
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In the text quoted from the Commentary

~

the de Hebdomadibus

of Boethius 1 st. Thomas describes the third and last kind of'participation:

"in like manner an effect is said to participate its

cause, and especially when it does not equal the power of its
cause, as, if we should say that the air participates the light of
the sun because it does not receive it in that brilliance which it
is in the sun.,,33
fect

That Thomas says, "especially when it

the ef-

does not equal the power of ita cause" seems to indicate

that he is referring here not to univocal causality, that of generation within a species for example l but of analogous causality,
not of secondary causes but principally of the first cause.

As

has been seen, this third type of participation has been called
transcendental or analogous participation by modern writers on the
subject. 34
Thomas describes the difference between predicamental and
transcendental participation in this way:
in two ways:

"Agreement can be had

(1) either between two things participating in some

one thing, and such agreement cannot be had between Creator and
creature •

..,

(2) or according as one thing exists of itself

and absolutely and the other being participates in it as much as
it can in a likeness of it.
if we supposed that

h~at

This would be the case, for instance,

existed without matter and fire agreed

33In de Hebd., lect. 2.
34 Th is third type of participation will continue to be called
transcendental in this study.
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with it by participating in some of the heat.

Such agreement can

be had between a creature and God, for God is called a being because He is His very own existence.

A creature, however, is not

its very own existence, but is called a being as something participating in existence. tt35

Logical or predicamental participation

is had when two participants share the same kind of nature or
quality.

Transcendental participation, however, is different in

this respect.

Transcendental participation concerns two beings:

one which possesses an attribute by virtue of its own essence and
according to all of the perfections of the attribute and the other
being participates in the perfection of this higher being by virj

tue of a likeness of the perfection possessed essentially by the
higher being.
From the text just cited two things are apparent about transscendental participation:

one, that it is had ultimately between

creature and Creator; the other, that it concerns likenesses or
similarities.

The relation between creature and Creator will be

treated elsewhere; similitude or likeness will be considered here.
The creature is said to participate in a likeness (similitudo

35In II Sent., 16, 1,1, ad 3: "Convenientia potest esse dupliciter: aut duorum participantium aliquod unum: et talis convenientia non potest esse Creatoris et creaturae • • • ; aut secundum quod unum per se est simpliciter, et alterum participat de
similitudine eius qu~ntum potest: ut si poneremus calorem esse
sine materia, et ignem conveniri cum eo ex hoc quod aliquid caloris participaret: et talis convenientia esse potest creaturae ad
Deum: quia Deus dicitur ens hoc modo quod est ipsum suum esse:
creatura vero non estipsum suum esse, sed dicitur ens quasi esse
participans."

43
of God.

This calls to mind the Platonic doctrine of participation

wherein the concrete, existing, sensible object is said to be an
imitation (eikon or mimesis) of the separately subsisting reality.
An important fact to be noted about St. Thomas' doctrine on
similitudo is that there can be similarity or likeness only among
those beings which are different in some respects.
be likeness where there is no diversity."36

"There cannot

If there were no di-

versity between the two beings that are said to be alike, there
could be no similarity because there would only be identity.
The next thing to be noted about similarity is that it is a
sort of relation;37 the relation exists between the two beings
that are said to be similar.

The exact nature of this relation

will be investigated elsewhere.
In the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas distinguishes three types
of likene s s :
rQ]uaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae communicant in eadem,forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum eundem
modum: et haec non solum dicuntur simi11a, sed aequa11a
in sua similitudinej sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur
similia in albedine. Et haec est perfect1ssima s1m11itudo.--Alio modo d1cuntur similia quae communicant in
forma secundum eandem rat1onem, et non secundum eundem
modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut m1nus albUm d1citur s1mile magis albo. Et haec est s1m1litudo imperfecta.--Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communicant in eadem forma, sed non secundum eandem rationemj

36In IV Sent., 40, 1, 2, ad 4: "S1militudo non poteat esse
ubi nonest aliqua diversitas." See also S.T., III, 5, 1, ad 3;
22, 1, ad 2; 46, 4, ad 1; where Thomas quotes St. John Damascene
in this regard.
37"Relatl0 quaeda.m,"

C.G., II, 11, Adhuc.
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ut patet in agentibus non univocis. 38
The three

ki~ds

of similaritYI then l are:

;
;,

(l) perfect l which is

had among beings possessing the same attribute according to the
same nature an in the same measure; (2) imperfect l or that which
is had among beings sharing the same attribute according to the
same nature but note in the same measure; and (3) £££-univocal l
or that which is had among beings only analogously agreeing l which
share the same attribute but not according to the same nature.
This third type may rightly be called transcendental or analogous
similari ty.
Since transcendental similarity is the type most to the purpose of this studYI a further investigation of its nature is in
order.

Moreoever l a treatment of this particular type follows im-

mediately upon the passage just quoted above; for in this article
of the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas is speaking of a creature's
similarity to God.
Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile inquantum est agens l
agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formaml necesse est
quod in effectu sit similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo
agens sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu l erit
similitudo inter f'aciens et factum in formal secundum eandem rationem speciei; sicut homo generat hominem. Si
autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit similitudo, sed non secundum eandem rationem speciei: sicut ea quae generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem
ad aliquam similitudinem solis, non tamen ut recipiant
formam solis secundum similitudinem speciei l sed secundum similitudinem generis.
Si igitur sit allquod agens, quod non in genere con-tineatur l effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad
38 S.T.

I

II

4, 3 c.

ii.,
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similitudinem formae agentis: non tamen ita quod participant similitudinem formae agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam,
sicut fpsum esse est commune omnibus. 39
The first example of likeness given here is between univocal beings, such as sire and offspring of the same species.

The other

two examples are of likenesses between non-univocal or analogous
beings, both of them representing cause and effect; but in the
first of these second two examples the effect is outside the species but not outside the genus of the cause, while in the second
example the effect has for its cause a being which cannot be contained within a genus.

As will be seen, it is this type of like-

ness that is had between God and creatures.

It is the most remote

of all the types of similitude, but it is a likeness nonetheless.
For, although the similarity that creatures bear toward their Creator is imperfect,40 still, inasmuch as each creature possesses a
perfection, it bears some resemblance to God. 4l
St. Thomas tells us that creatures are like God according to
the third type of likenes s, that of analogous likenes s.

It[E] very

creature represents Him and is like Him so far as it possesses
some perfection:

yet not so far as to represent Him as something

of the same species or genus, but as the superabounding source of
whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind

39Ibid.
40S.T., I, 13, 5, ad 2.
4l Ibid •., corpus.
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of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the powe~ of the sun."42

The creature, inasmuch as it has

any perfection, is a likeness of Godj but it does not represent
God as though it were of the same species or genus of God but as
something falling far short of the divine model in regard to form,
manner, and measure of existence.

Fabro calls this likeness a

"similitudine degradata," a likeness on a lower level of being. 43
Aquinas tells us, furthermore, that in the non-univocal or
analogous cause the likeness of the effect is to be found in a
higher manner, while in the effect the likeness of the cause is
present in a lesser degree. 44
But where is the likeness of the effect found in the higher
analogous cause?
as:

In the divine intellect, according to St. Thom-

"Although creatures are not so perfect as to be specifically

like God in nature, after the manner in which a man begotten is
like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to
Him, according to the representation in the examplar known by God;
just as a material house is like the house in the architect's
42 Ibid ., artic le 2, c: II [Ql uaeli bet creatura intantum eum
Deum repraesentat, et est ei si~11is, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet: non tamen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid
eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius tamen aliqualem s1militudinem effectus consequunturj sicut
formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem."
43La Nozione Metafisica, p. 318.
44C.G., II, 98, Dicunt: "In causis autem non univocis similitudo effectus est in causa eminentius, causae autem in effectu
inferiori modo."
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mind."45
like an

The creature is said to be like God inasmuch as it is
ide~

of itself which is in the divine intellect, just as

the house which has been built is like the idea of itself that was
conceived in the mind of the architect long before the house was
constructed.
What is the content of the idea in the divine mind?
Thomas says that this idea contains the natures of things.

St.
There

is in the divine mind an idea of everything that exists in reality:

It[TJhe essences of things as existing in the knowledge of God

are called ideas. 1t46
This participation in God according to the creature's likeness to God is had on the part of the creature according to its
form.

If

Since it is from the form that a thing has its being; and

since a thing, inasmuch as it has being, approaches to a likeness
of God, Who is His own simple being:

it follows of necessity that

the form is nothing else than a participation of the divine similitude in things.

Wherefore Aristotle, speaking of the form, right

ly says (I Phys. ix.) that it is something godlike and desirable." 7

45S.T., I, 44, 3, ad 1 (I, 430): ItLicet creaturae non pertingant-ad hoc quod sint similes Deo secundum suam naturam, simili
tudine speciei, ut homo genitus homini generantii attingunt tamen
ad eius similitudinem secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis."
46S• T., I, 14, praef. (I, 135): It[R]ationes autem rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente, ideae vocantur."
47C.G., III, 97 (IV, 47): "Cum enim forma sit secundum quam
res habet-esse; res autem quaelibet secundum quod habet'esse, accedat ad similitudinem Dei
ui est i sum esse sim lex· necease
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For the creature, its form is the divine likeness participated.
That Thomas equivalates the form of a being with the likeness of
God in which the creature participates, should be clear from this
passage.
The notion of likeness is definitely at home in the realm of
formal causality and its subdivision of exemplary causality.

A

creature is like God, made unto His image and likeness, because by
virtue of God's power and providence it possesses a form and the
exemplary cause of this is contained in the divine mind.

This no-

tion of similitude or likeness belongs to the static or essential
j

side of participation, that is, to the province of formal and exem
plary causality; formal on the part of the creature, exemplary on
the part of the Creator.
As a kind of summary of St. Thomas' main ideas on similitudo
and an introduction to the existential or dynamic element in participation, the following passage from the Summa Contra Gentiles
is apt.
Effectus enim a suis causis deficientea non conveniunt
cum eia in nomine et ratione, necease eat tamen aliquam
inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat
secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa
excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum
alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa aequivoca dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus
calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde

est quod forma nihil ait aliud quam divina similitudo participata
in rebus; unde convenienter Aristoteles, in I Physic., de forma
loquens, dicit quod est divinum quoddam et ~ibile." The
exact reference to the Physics is I, 9, I92~a;-r8.
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oportet quod calor a sole generatus a11qualem s1m111tud1nem obt1neat ad v1rtutem act1vam so11s, per quam calor
1n istis inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius sol calidus
dicitur, quamv1s non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus il11s simi11s a11qua11ter dicltur in qu1bus suos effectus
eff1cac1ter 1nducit: a qu1bus tamen rursus omnibus dissim111s est, inquantum hu1usmodi effectus non eodem modo
poss1dent calorem et huiusmodo quo in sole inven1tur.
Ita et1am et Deus omnes perfect10nes rebus tribuit, ac
per hoc cum omnibus sim11itudinem habet et d1ssim11itudinem simul.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • •

• • • S1m11e en1m a11cu1 d1c1tur quod e1us possidet qualitatem vel formam. Qu1a igitur id quod in Deo perfecte
est, 1n rebus a11is per quandam def1c1entem part1c1pat1onem 1nven1tur, 111ud secundum quod s1m11itudo attend1tur, De1 qu1dem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae.
Et sic creatura habet quod De1 est: unde et Deo recte
simi11s dicitur. 48
All beings tend to produce things that are 11ke themselves.

For

this reason, creatures .bear some resemblance to God, their Creator
From the point of view of the creatures, they are sa1d to be like
God because they part1cipate in the divine essence through a likeness of God.

The likeness is the sim11itude of one or more of the

perfect10ns of God.

These perfections are present in the1r high-

est degree 1n God but in a lesser degree 1n creatures.
The other main aspect of participat10n to be considered is
the dynam1c or existent1al, which 1nvolves the creature's receiving and actualizing a form by virtue of the d1vine operations of
creation, conservation, and providence.

The last of these three

operations pertains to final causality; the first two belong principally to effic1ent causality.
Nowhere does Thomas exp11citly state that part1cipation 1n48 C.G., I, 29.
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volves efficient causality, but the close connection between the
two concepts. is implied in many places.

For example, in the opus-

culum De Ente et Essentia, there is the statement:

"Now, whatever

belongs to a being is either caused by the principles of its nature, as the capability of laughter in man, or it comes from some
extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the sun's influence.
But it is impossible that the act of existing be caused by a
thing's form or its quiddity, (I say caused as by an efficient
cause); for then something would be the cause of itself and would
bring itself into existence--which is impossible.

Everything,

then, which is such that its act of existing is other than its nature must needs have its act of existing from something else."49
Although there is no explicit mention of participation here, several of its elements are in evidence:

(l) causality, and then two

results of causality, (2) the reception of a perfection from an
extrinsic being, and (3) existence from another being.

Thomas,

however, does explicitly state here that the being that does not
possess existence in its own essence must have it from another as

49De Ente et Essentia, C. IV; ed. Perrier, Opuscula Omnia
necnon opera-Minora, I, Opera Philosophica (Paris, 1949), 41, n.
22 (On BeIn~ and Essence, trans. Armand Augustine Maurer, C.S.B •.
('roronto, 1 4W-; p. 47): "Omne autem quod convenit alicui, vel
est causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine,
vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere
ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit
causatum ab ipsa forma vel quidditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficientej quia sic aliqua res esset causa sui ipsius, et aliqua
res seipsum in esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo oportat quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua,
habeat esse ab alio."
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from an efficient cause.

It would seem l therefore l that St. Thom-

as considered efficient causality as closely related to participation l if not essential to the doctrine.
Another text which implies the close relation between the notion of participation and efficient causality is the following:
1'[WJhatever is found in anything by participation must be caused in
it by that to which it belongs essentiallYI as iron becomes heated
by fire. 1150

Although there is no explicit mention made of effici-

ent causality here l it may be reasonably inferred l because the
production of red-hot iron (as in the example above) would necessitate l besides the form of fire, an agent causing its actual existence.
As is evident from the passage just quoted from the Summa
Theolo iae, causality with its concomitant notion of dependence of
effect on cause is a topic closely connected with participation. 51
he reason for this close coru1ection is that participation by its
very notion connotes

rec~ption

and passivity, and demands an agent

to fulfill its act of participating.
Also closely connected with the idea of participation is the
fact that the perfection caused in the participant must belong
substantially or essentially to the ultimate cause.

St. Thomas

5 0 S.T., I, 44, 1 c (I, 427): II[Sli • • • aliquid invenitur in
aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo
cui essentialiter convenitj sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. tt
510f • also S.T., I, 44, 4, arg. lj 49, 3, arg. 4; 61, 1
4, arg. 2j 96, l-c; and O.G., I, 98.

Cj

65 1

52;

does not mention ultimate cause in his treatment of these matters;
but it may

~e

legitimately supposed that he means this here be-

cause in the passages in which he speaks of participation in the
transcendental

sense5~

he is speaking of the operations of God to-

ward creatures.
The first of the operations of God as efficient cause that
will be considered is creation.

This act of the Divinity is de-

fined by the Angelic Doctor as the production of a thing in its
entire substance, with nothing being presupposed either created or
uncreated. 53

St. Thomas further describes creation as the ema-

nation of all being from non-being which is nothing. 54

It is the

;>

production of the complete being with nothing presupposed as regards matter or the like.

Man is created, says Thomas, from that

which is not man; and whiteness is created from that which is not
white. 55
Thomas also holds that a necessary part of creation is the
creation of prime matter and passive potency.

n[IJt is necessary

to say that even prime matter is created by the universal cause of

52See any of the texts cited in the preceding note or S.T.,
I, 44, 1 c, as given in note 50.
53S.T., I, 65, 3 c: "Creatio • • • est productio alicuius
rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito quod sit
vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum."
54 Ibid., 45, 1 c:
quod est nihil."

"emanatio totius esse • • • ex non ente

55Ibid.: "homo fit ex non-homine, et album ex non-albo."
Thomas has a fuller treatment of these points in his In II Sent.,
112

53
things. tt56

The reason is that, if the entire supposite is a cre-

ated being, everything pertaining to the being must be created,
even if it be prime matter or passive potency.

Otherwise, a part

of the created being would be uncreated, which would be a contradiction.

"[IJ t is necessary that even what is potential in it

should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.,,57
Not only are all creatures created by God;58 but it is only
God--the first cause, the prime mover, the absolute being, existence itself--Who can create anything.

God, according to Thomas'

natural theology, cannot even delegate the act of creation to any
creature.
",:

"[IJ t is impossible for any creature to create, either

by its own power, or instrumentally--that is, ministerially.,,59
This total and complete production of the creature by the
Creator indicates a relation of total dependence of creature on
God.

II

[c] reation

in the creature is only a re lation of a certain

kind to the Creator as to the principle of its being.,,60

This

56Ibid., 44, 2 c (I, 429): "oportet ponere etiam materiam
primam ~tam ab universali causa entium."
57Ibid ., ad 3 (I, 429): "oportet quod etiam illud quod se
habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse ipsius pertinet, creatum est."
58Ibid., 45, 2 c; 44, 1 c.
59Ibid., 45, 5 c (I, 440): lIimpossibile est quod aliC\1i creaturae C'OrlVeniat creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per ministerium. 1I The same is said in 65, 3 c.
60 Ibid ., 45, 3 c (I, 437): "creatio in creatura non sit nisi
relatio quaedam ad Creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in
passione quae est cum motu, importatur relatio ad principlum motus.

I
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"relation of a certain kind" is a real relation in the creature
but not in God; in God the relation is mBrely rational inasmuch as
the creatures are referred to Him..

"[eJ rea ture s

are really re-

lated to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to
creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are
related to Him."61

creatures is His conservation of creatures in the state of being.
In the Summa Theologiae Thomas states that the being of each and
every creature so depends upon God that not for a moment could the
creature exist if it were not kept in being by the operation of
the divine power.

"For the being of eyery creature depends on God

so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness, were it not kept in being by the operation of the divine power. "62..

In the same article Thomas illustrates this teach-

ing with one of his crystal-clear examples.
Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad
solem illuminantem. ~icut enim sol est lucens per suam
naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen al
sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus
Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est

61Ibid., 13, 7 c (I, 124): "creaturae realiter referuntur ad
ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum." Also see 6, 2, ad 1; 13, 7, ad 2, 4, & 5; 32, 2 c;
45, 3, ad 1; and III, 2, 7 c.
62 Ibid ., I, 104, 1 c (I, 963): "Dependet enim esse cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conserverentur in esse."
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suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative,
non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad litt., virtus Dei ab eis
quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul
et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. 63
Just as the air would have no light if the sun would cease to
shine, so every creature, which participates in the existence of
God, Who is His own existence, would cease to exist if the ruling
power of God were withdrawn from His creatures.
The last phase of existential partiCipation to be considered
is God's providence over creatures.

This aspect of the question

is concerned with God as the greatest good and last end of all
creatures.

"

Hence it presents the notion of God as the final cause

of all created being.
The Angelic Doctor states that the plan of all things as directed toward their final end is providence. 64
notion of providence into two divisions:

He also divides the

(1) first there is the

order of things that are ordained beforehand to their end; and,
then, (2) there is the execution of this order, which is called
government. 65

It would seem that both the plan of creatures di-

rected toward their end and the execution of this plan by God refer to His final causality_

64 Ibid ., :3 c:
providentia est."

URatio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie

65Ibid. "Ad providentiam duo pertinent: scilicet ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae
gubernatio dicitur." Thomas also describes providence as the chief
Ipart of orudence. "prlncipalis pars prudentlae" (Ibid •• 1 c).
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The reason why God is said to direct everything in nature toward an end ~s that God is the Creator of every good in nature,66
both the good that a creature has in his substantial being and the
good possessed by the creature by virtue of his relation to other
creatures and to his final end, the divine essence. 67

Since God,

then, is an intellectual being, his act of creation must have followed a predetermined plan (at least logically prior by nature).
This plan or ordination of all creatures toward their last end is
what is called providence.
Omne enim bonum quod est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, •
••
In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum
ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum
in finem, et praecipue in finem ultimum, qui est bonitas
divina, • ••
Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit
causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui
effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, • • •
necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente
divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem,
proprie providentia est.68
This universal ordination of all creatures to God, as to their
last end, by attraction to the highest good is called providence
and represents the aspect of finality to be found in transcendental participation.
Thus it has been seen that in the essential or static order,
that is, in the order of likeness, transcendental participation
involves formal causality in God inasmuch as the exemplary form of

66Ibid., 6, 4 c.
67 Ibid ., 21, 4 c.
68Ibid.~ 22~ 1 c.
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every created object is contained in the divine mind.

In the crea

ture this involyes formal causality inasmuch as it deals with the
form to be received.

In the existential or dynamic order, partic-

ipation involves efficient and final causality on the part of God.
In the creature existential participation is concerned with the
actual reception of the form in the predisposed matter; and it is
this matter and form that are preserved in existence and directed

,I
-,·1{

: !~

toward their final end by God's final and efficient causality.

I

I

,~ I

CHAPTER III
THE POSITION OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
ON THE PARTICIPATION OF
CREATURES IN GOOD
After the investigation of the nature of the addition made by
the concept of good to that of being has been made and an examination of the Thomistic doctrine of participation in general and
transcendental participation in particular has been completed, a
study can now be undertaken of St. Thomas' doctrine on participation in good.
In the De Veritate St. Thomas inaugurates his treatment of
participation in good by posing the question:
by the first goodness?

Is everything good

After refuting the arguments of some of

the adversaries who had weird opinions about the type of causality
exercised by God in the creation of the world,l
to treat Plato's position.

~

Thomas proceeds

Plato and the Platonists, following

lDavid of Dinant and others held that God is the same as
prime matter. Thomas denies this on the score of Aristotle's
teaching that an efficient cause cannot contain within it a material cause because these two causes have contrary characters.
Others, such as the followers of Amalric of BEme, held that God is
the form of all things. About this position Thomas says, "efficiens vero et forma effecti idem sunt specie, in quantum orone agens
agit sibi simile, sed non idem numero, quia non potest idem esse
faciens et factum" (De ill., 21, 4 c).
58

S9

the Academic's doctrine of subsistent ideas and participation of
creatures therein, taught that all things are called good by virtue of their participation in the first goodness, which is God. 2
Thomas rejects this
the Porretans 3

op~nion

and one similar to it that was held by

because, with Aristotle, Thomas held that there

were no subsistent ,ideas but that the forms of things were in
things themselves and not separated from them.
other Aristotelian argument:

Thomas invokes an-

even granting that there were sub-

sistent ideas, Plato's position would not apply to good because
good is not predicated univocally; and in cases in which the predicationwas not univocal, Plato did not assign a single idea. 4
St. Thomas finds one fault with the thinking of the Platonist
school on this point.

It seems to forget that "every agent is

found to effect something like itself." S

Hence, the first good-

ness" which is understood as the effective cause of all good
things" imprints a likeness of itself upon the things it effects.
Therefore, every good thing is good by reason of an inherent form
which is a likeness of the divine gOOdness.

The formal causality

2Thomas used the term Platonici to refer especially to the
Neoplatonists; these would Include, for example, Plotinus, Proclus,
and Pseudo-Dionysius.
3 The followers of Gilbert of La PorNfe (died in l20S); SOme
of the more famous Porretans were Simon de Tournai, Alain de Lille,
Nicolas d'Amiens, and Raoul Ardent.

4De Ver., 21, 4 c.
SIbid., (111,20):

"omne agens invenitur sibi simile agere. 1t

60

on the part of God l which Plato taughtl is saved inasmuch as God
is the

exem~lary

cause of all good things.

St. Thomas' opinion l

then l is a modification of Plato's.
Unde si prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonoruml
oportet quodsimilitudinem suam imprimat in rebus effectis; et sic unumquodque dicetur bonum sicut forma inhaerente per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditam l et
ulterius per bonitatem primam l sicut per exemplar et
effectivum omnis" bonitatis creatae. Quantum ad hoc
opinio Platonis sustineri potest.
Sic ergo dicimus secundum communem opinionem l quod
omnia sunt bona bonitate creata formaliter sicut forma
inhaerente l bonitate vero increata sicut forma exemplari. 6
St. Thomas went along with Plato in saying that all things were
good by the first goodness, but Thomas held that the likeness of
the divine goodness that the creature possessed was had as an inherent form and in this way the created good is good by the first
goodness which is the efficient and exemplary cause of all good
things.

The form of goodness which the creature has is the same

formality as the goodness of God but it is not possessed according
to the same nature (that is, substantially or essentially) or in
the same degree of limitless perfection.

Nonetheless l the good-

ness of the creature is a true l if a lesser, likeness of the divine goodness.
This same doctrine seems to be treated a little more succintly by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

As is customary in

this work, several proofs are offerred for one proposition.

The

6Ibid. See" also ad 1, where Thomas says that the goodness of
a creature is drawn out of the divine goodness: ttBonitas creaturae extrahitur a divina bonitate."
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statement that God is the good of every good is proved by arguments based oq God's being all-perfect, and His exemplary and final causality.
The first proof is based upon the fact that God, Who contains
all the perfections of creatures, must also possess all the goodness that creatures have, because the goodness of each thing is
its perfection and act. 7 "For the goodness of a thing is its perfection. • • •

Now, since God is simply perfect, He contains in

His perfection the perfections of all things • • • •

Therefore

His goodness contains all goodnesses; and consequently He is the
good of every good."B

God, Who is all-perfect, accordingly pos-

sesses the perfection of every goodness and thus is the good of
every good.
The second proof that Thomas gives for the same proposition
is based on exemplary causality.

"A thing is not said to have a

quality by participation, except in so far as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially:
thus iron is said to be fiery in so far as it partakes of a resemblance to fire.

Now, God is good essentially, while 'all else

is good by participation. • • •

7C.G., I, 37, Amplius:
perfecti~ eius."

Therefore nothing is said to be

"Bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et

8Ibid., I, 40 (I, 87): "Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est perfectio-rpBius. • ••
Deus, autem, cum sit simpliciter perfectus,
sua perfectione orones rerum perfectiones comprehendit. •
Sua
igitur bonitas orones bonitates comprehendit. Et ita est omnis
boni bonum."
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good except in so far as it bears some resemblance to the divine
goodness.

Therefore He is the good of every good. 1I9

Unless there

is a regress into infinity, which would be repugnant to the notion
of 'finality,lO there must be a being which is goodness itself and
which does not possess goodness from another through participation
but has it by its own essence.

This being, known to the human in-

tellect by various names--such as the first cause, the prime mover
or the greatest good--is the cause of all created goods, among
which are included logically all goods other than the supreme good
According to the Thomistic theory of participation, then, any being possessing some quality through participation, possesses it
through a likeness of an attribute of the same kind had by a being
that possesses it by virtue of its essence.

And if a creature

possesses goodness, it does so through a likeness of the divine
goodness.

II[N] othing

is said to be good except in so far as it

beara some resemblance to the divine goodness." ll

Thus does God

exercise the function of exemplary causality toward the creature
that participates in His goodness.

9Ib id.: "Quod per participationem dicitur aliquale, non dicitur tare-nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod
per ~ssentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum dicitur ignitum inquantum
quandam similitudinem ignis participat. Sed Deua eat bonus per
essentiam, omnis vero alia per participationem. • ••
Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis. .liat igitur ipse bonum omnis boni."
10Ibid., I, 37.
llIbid., I, 40: "Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum
habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis."
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The third and last proof given in the Summa Contra Gentiles
that God is tbe good of every good is taken from God's finality
and the nature of goodness

itself~

"Since a thing is desirable

for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its being desirable; it follows that a thing is said to be good, either
because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end.

There-

fore the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of
Now this is God. • • •
Therefore God is the good of every
good. h12 Since good is that toward which there is an appetititive
good.

tendency and every .end toward which a being tends is a real or an
apparent good or something leading to such a good, the notions of
good and end are inseparable. 13

The ultimate end of all creatures

is that to which all beings are ordained and from which all intermediate ends receive the notion of finality.

That God is the fi-

nal end of all creatures is proved in the third book of the Summa
Contra Gentiles. 14
All creatures, then, participating in God's goodness through
a likeness of the divine goodness, participate also in the notion
of finality, which is found in its highest and ultimate perfection

l2Ibid., (I, 86-87): "Cum unumquodque appetibile sit propter
finem; boni autem ratio consistat in hoc quod est appetibile: 0portet quod unumquodque dicatur bonum vel quia est finis, vel quia
ordinatur ad finem. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem
boni accipiunt. Hoc autem Deus est. • ••
Est igitur Deus omnis
boni bonum. It
l3 This was discussed in Chapter I, pp. 14-16; see also De Ver.,
21, 2 Cj and S.T., 5, 3 c.

l4 Ibid ., C. 17.

---

;,
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in God's goodness.

Moreover, any being seeking a creature as its

end, seeks it only inasmuch as it participates in the notion of
finality found in God and inasmuch as the creature is ordained to
the divine goodness.

For St. Thomas says:

uln all mutually sub-

ordinate ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding
end:

thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man; and is

given to him that he may be purged; and he be purged that he may
be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that
health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of
those that precede.

Now all things are subordinate in various de-

grees of goodness to the one supreme good, that is the cause of
all goodness:

and so, since good has the aspect of an end, all

things are subordinate to God as preceding ends under the last
end.

'l'herefore God must be the end of all. u15

Thus, just as in

curing a patient the doctor uses several remedies to obtain the
desired end, which is the health of the patient, so in creation
the various degrees in the hierarchy of goods are all directed toward the greatest good, which is the cause of every good.
There is this difference, however, between the example just

l5C.G., III, 17 (III, 34): "In ommibus finibus ordinatis 0portet quod ultimus finis sit finis omnium praecedentium finium:
sicut, si potio conficitur ut detur aegroto, datur autem ut purgetur, purgatur autem ut extenuetur, extenuatur autem ut sanetur;
oportet quod sanitas sit finis et extenuationis et purgationis et
aliorum praecedentium. Sed omnia inveniuntur in diversis gradibus
bonitatis ordinata sub uno summo bono, quod est causa omnis bonitatis: ac per hoc, cum bonum habeat rationem finis, omnia ordinantur sub Deo sicut fines praecedentes sub fine ultimo." This
passage also shows the quaint medical practices of the thirteenth
centur •
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given from the Contra. Gentiles and the doctrine intended.

The

means the doctor uses are not goods in themselves, except useful
goods; while many goods in the transcendental hierarchy of good
could be real goods.

The castor oil which the doctor might use to

cure a patient is not an end in itself, and thus it is neither an
honorable good nor by any stretch of the imagination is it a
pleasurable good; but it is a useful good.

But a servant of God

could take a vacation in order to serve God better.

The vacation

would be a pleasurable good, something desired in itself and thus
having the true idea of an end; but it would be directed at the
same time to a greater good, the service of God.

In this way all

the genuine goods are ordained to the divine goodness, the cause
of every good.
It has been seen, then, that God is the cause of every good
in creatures; for all creatures share or participate in the goodness of God through a likeness of the divine goodness which the
creatures receive as inherent forms and constituent principles.
It is the form of goodness which gives the creature the notion of
finality and makes of it a true end.

The actualization of this

form is accomplished by God's efficient causality in His operation
of creation and conservation.

"Everything is therefore called

good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary, effective and final principle of all goodness.

Nevertheless, every-

thing is called good by reason of the likeness of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby
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it is denominated good." 16

This passage from the Summa Theologiae

gives the same position about a creature's possession of good that
is found in the De Veritate: 17

although the divine goodness is

the exemplary, efficient, and final cause of all goodness in creatures, the creature still possesses its likeness of the divine
goodness as a form that inheres in the creature's essential constitution.
A further point to be noted about good is that it is perfective according to its act of existence as well as its specific
character.18

A creature's act of existence is provided for by God' f

efficient causality; the specific character, by God's exemplary
causality; but the species or nature is actuated by efficient causality, and both the specific character and its existence are directed to God by His final causality.

II

[A]ir is said to be bright

from the sun, not because the very fact that the air is referred
to the sun is the brightness of the air, but because the placing
of the air directly before the sun is the cause of its being
bright.

It is in this way that the creature is called good with

reference to God." 19

Just as the light of the sun causes light in

16S •T., I, 6, 4 c (I, 55): "Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonTtate divina, sicut primo principio exemplar1, effectivo et
finali totius bonitatis. Nihilom1nus tamen unumquodque dicitur
bonum sim11itud1ne divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est
formaliter sua bonitas denomlnans ipsum."
172:1, 4 c.
18De Ver., 22, 1, ad 1.
19 Ibid .-".. 21. 4. ad 2 (III. 20-21):

tla_er dicatur lucen8 a 80-
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the air, so does the divine goodness cause goodness in the
ture, giving

i~

crea~

the formality of goodness, the actual existence of

the formality of goodness; and in its formality the creature receives tile direction of its goodness to the greatest good through
God's efficient causality.
This causal relation between creature and Creator indicates
the dependence of the creature on the Creator for the constituent
principles of its make-up, not only for its being called into being but also for its preservation in existence.

As was indicated
.j

above,20

St. Thomas seems to mention participation explicitly on-

ly in connection with God's exemplary causality, inasmuch as creatures participate in the divine essence by a likeness of that essence which is their form.

This exemplary causality, however, at

the least presupposes efficient and final causality; for the form
would be of no avail if it were not actuated in some matter, nor
would the agent act if it did not have some reason or end in mind.
Therefore, the actualization and ordering of the exemplary causality involved in the part played by God in participation depends
upon His efficient and final causality.
Moreover, in certain passages from the writings of st. Thomas

le: non quod ipsum referri aerem ad solem sit lucere aeris, sed
quia directa oppositio aeris ad solem est causa quod luceat. Et.
hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum.1t The context here, where Thomas is explaining how creatures can have goodness from God, makes it clear that bonum in this passage refers to
God, the Summum Bonum.
20Chapter II, pp. 49-51.

!
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he almost says that efficient and exemplary causality are a part
of the role played by God in the participation of creatures in His
goodness.

In the De Veri tate Thomas says that the likeness by

which the creature shares in the goodness of God is imprinted on
the creature by God's efficient causality.

"If • • • the first

goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its
likeness upon the things produced~·1f2l From the context here it is
seen that St. Thomas held that the first good was the cause of all
other goods, and he states that this comes about by impressing a
likeness of the first goodness upon the creature, which seems to
denote the operation of efficient causality.
In the passage from the

S~

Theologiae where Thomas proves

that the first goodness is the cause of all other goodness, efficient causality is put on a par with exemplary and final causality.
"Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as
from the first exemplary, effective and final principle of all
goodness.,,22

Here Thomas mentions all three causes in the same

[breath.
It is true that causality is not participation.

Participa-

tion by its very nature connotes limitation, passivity, and reception of something from some extrinsic source.

The causality of

21De Ver. 21, 4 c (III, 20): "8i prima bonitas sit effectiva
- ' oportet quod similitudinem imprimat in rebus efomnium bonorum,

~ectis."

22S .T., I, 6, 4 C (I, 55): "Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali
Itotius boni taU s. "
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God, however, is what makes participation possible. 23
causality is the role that God plays in participation.
causes are needed to make participation work.

The divine
All of the

Why restrict partic

ipation to exemplary causality?
But in spite of the arguments for making efficient and final
causality a part of the system of participation, there seems to be
no text of St. Thomas' writings that explicity states this doctrine.

In a characteristic statement of Aquinas on participation

it is likeness or similitude that is highlighted.
is one such typical passage:

The following

itA thing is not said to have a qual-

ity by participation, except in so far as it bears SOme resemblanc
to that which is said to have that quality essentially."24

The

likeness of the divine goodness that the creature possesses is wha
entitles the creature to be called good.
Perhaps it could be said that participation is had principall
through exemplary causality and secondarily through final and efficient causality.
,:

It cannot be said, however, that St. Thomas

taught such a hierarchy of causality in the matter of participation, because there is no text that would bear out such an opinion.
After realizing that God is the total cause of goodness in
creatures, one might ask, "Why did God wish to share His goodness

23See pages 50-51 and note 51 for texts and references to te
texts showing connection between participation and causality.
24 C•G., I, 40 (I, 86): "Quod per participationem dicitur ali
quale, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem
eius quod per essentiam dicitur."
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with others?"

ItBecause He is so good," st. Thomas answers.

is infinitely good:

ItGod

for which reason He admits His creatures to a

participation of good thingS.n2~It is God's infinite goodness that
prompts Him to share His goodness with creatures.

His complete

goodness needs nothing else, but it motivates Him to share it with
creatures.
Many texts testify to the fact that Aquinas believed that God
poured forth His goodness upon creatures freely.

In the De Veri-

tate he quotes Pseudo-Dionysius as saying, "the divine goodness
communicates itself to us like the sun, which, without previous
choice or knowledge, pours out its rays upon all bodies.,,26

In

another place Aquinas says that it is in the, communication of good
in general that God does no picking or choosing, but in the communication of this or that good there is some question of choice. "If

2:5S •T., III, 23, 1 c (D.T., 11,2147 a):. ItDeus. ; • est infinitae-bonitatis: ex qua contingit quod ad participationem bonorum suas creaturas admittit." In another place St. Thomas says
the same thing: "Ad productionem creaturarum nihil aliud movet
Deum nisi sua bonitas, quam rebus aliis communicare voluit secundum modum assimilationis ad ipsum." This last citation is from
the Contra Gentiles, II, 46.
26
Pseudo~Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 4; PG 3, 694; as
quoted by St. Thomas, De Ve"ritate, 5, 2, argo 1 (I, 207): "divina
bonitas se creaturis communicat sicut noster sol, non f.raeeligens
neque praecognoscens, radio suos in corpora diffundit.' St. Thomas explains this dictum of Dionysius 1n the same article, ad 1:
"Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod similitudo Dionysii quantum ad hoc
attenditur, quod sicut sol nullum corpus excludit, quantum in se
est, a sui luminis communicationej ita etiam nec divina bonitas
aliquam creaturam a sui participatione." In S.T., I, 19, 4, ad 1
and De Ver., 23, 1, ad 1 Thomas makes the same comment on the same
passage of Dionysiusj this doctrine is also set forth in S.T., I,
23, 4, ad 1, while in I, 21, 4 c and C.G., II, 28 Thomas says that
God .La more generous than the situation demands.

the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered l
God communicates His goodness without election l inasmuch as there
is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness • • • •
But if we consider the communication of this or that particular
good l He does not allot it without election; since He gives certai
goods to some men, which He does not give to others.,,27

So it is

that the divine goodness is manifested in creatures, by God's giving one what the other does not

receive and sharing with another

some aspect of the divine essence not imparted to the first. Every
creature, however, gets something and in this respect God refuses
no creature His goodness.
The communication of the divine goodness through a diversity
of creatures is admirably explained in the Summa Contra Gentiles.
Deus per suam providentiam omnia ordinat in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem: non autem hoc modo quod suae bonitati aliquid per ea quae fiunt accrescat, sed ut similitudo suae bonitatis, quantum possibile est, imprimatur
in rebus. Quia vero omnem creatam substnntiam a perfectione divinae bonitatis deficere necesse est, ut perfectius divinae bonitntis similitudo rebus communicaretur,
oportuit esse diversitatem in rebus, ut quod perfecte ab
uno repraesentari non potest, per diversa diversimode
perfectiori modo repraesentaretur: nam et homo, cum
mentis conceptum uno vocali verbo videt sufficienter exprimi non posse, verba diversimode multiplicat ad exprimendam per diversa suae mentis conceptionem. Et in hoc
etiam divinae perfectionis eminentia conaiderari potest,
quod perfecta bonitas, quae in Deo est unite et simpliciter, in creaturis esse non potest nisi secundum modum

27 S • T., I, 23, 4, ad 1 (I, 244): "Si consideratur communicatio bonitatis divinae in communi, absque electione bonitatem suam'
communicat; inquantum scilicet nihil est, quod non participet aliquid de bonitate eius. • ••
Sed si consideretur communicatio
istius vel illius boni l non absque electione tribuit: quia quaedam bona dat ali uibus
uae non dat aliis."

,

. ;,c

'Ii!.

diversum et per plura. Res autem per hoc diversae sunt,
quod formas habent diversas, a quibus speciem sortiuntur.
Sic igitur ex fine sumitur ratio diversitatis formarum
in rebus. 28 .
Diversity among creatures is had, then, so that the various aspects of the divine goodness may be portrayed better.

Since no

one of the participants in the divine essence can manifest all of
its perfections, the divine goodness is better known through the
..

diversity of creatures found in creation.

i~

Although St. Thomas says, "The divine goodness keeps no creature from participating in itself,"29 in other places he affirms
that creatures can limit the amount of the divine essence they
.are capable of receiving.

"Good c ommunica te s itself.

It belongs

I

,I

to the highest good, therefore, to communicate itself in the highest possible degree, that is, as much as each and everything is
capable of receiving it.

Consequently, if it does not communicate

itself to something, this is because that thing is not capable of

28C.G., III, 97. In De Ver., 5, 8, argo 9, Thomas quotes
Pseudo-Dionysius (accord~ng-to Spiazzi, Quaestiones Disputatae, I,
102 a; but no further reference is given) on the same subject:
"Magis autem manifestatur divina bonitas, ut dicit Dionysius, in
diversitate naturarum quam in numerositate eorum quae eandem naturam habent; et propter hoc etiam non facit omnes creaturas rationales vel per se existentes, sed quasdam rationales, et quasdam
per se existentes, et alias existentes in alio, sicut accidentia."
The Leonine edition, as\translated into English, attributes the say..
ing to St. Augustine of Hippo (Truth, I, p. 230); and this idea is
found in three places in the writings of Augustine: Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, I, 4, PL 42, 606-607; De genesi contrs
Manicheos, I, 21, PL 34, 188-189; and Octoginta Trium Quaestionum,
XLI, PL 40, 27.
29 De Ver., 5, 2, ad 1 (I, 210): "nec divina bonitas a1iquam
creaturam a sui participatione exc1udit."

<

,;

'73

eceiving it. n30

Thomas, however, gives an answer to this diffi-

culty of how the divine goodness can communicate itself freely and
t the same time give more to one than to the other.

nIt belongs

o the divine goodness as infinite to give from its perfections
hatever the nature of each thing requires and is capable of receiving.,,3l

The key to the problem here is nature.

A certain na-

ture or essence can take only a limited amount of perfection.
Therefore, although God communicates to this nature as freely as
e does to others, still this being will receive less of the divine perfection because it is so limited by its nature, which includes the limiting principle as well as the specific or characteristic perfection.

Because of other circumstances, free will,

for example, in human beings, the amount of perfection one individal will receive is different from what another will participate.
Aquinas says that good (and God is the greatest good) is even
extended to non-beings.

"Good extends to non-beings • • • causall

inasmuch as non-beings tend to good.

And so we can call non-beings

things which are in potency and not in act."32.

Inasmuch as non-

3 0 Ibid., 6, 2, argo 6 (I, 261): "Bonum est communicativum aui
ipsius.~go summi boni est summe se communicare, secundum quod
numquodque est capax. 8i ergo alicui non se communicat, hoc est
quia non est'capax ejus."
31Ibid., ad 6 (I, 266): "Quod ad bonitatem divinam pertinet,
in quanrum-est infinita, ut de perfectionibus quas unaquaeque res
secundum 9uam naturam requirit, unicuique largiatur, secundum quod
est ejus capax. 1i The underscoring is in neither text.
32 De Ver., 21, 2, ad 2 (III, 11): "Bonum • • • se extendit a
non entia :-7 . per causalitatem, inquantum non entia appetunt
dica us non entia ea uae sunt in otentia et non in
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beings tend toward good, the goodness of God extends toward them
by final causality.

Elsewhere St. Thomas says that in this re-

spect the notion of good is more extensive than that of being; for,
when non-beings tend toward being, they tend toward it as a good,
i

i r~

. I'

and only good things seek good. 33

i

After the consideration of the part God plays in participation, that is, His role as the First Cause according to the efficient, final, and exemplary modes of causality, there remains to be
seen the manner in which creatures participate in the greatest
good, which is the divine goodness.
As has been seen, Aquinas tells us that creatures participate
in the divine goodness by a likeness of that goodness.

Inasmuch

as a creature possesses the nature of goodness, to that extent is
it like the divine goodness. 34

The goodness which the creature has

is a likeness of the goodness of God--not an exact image of the
divine essence because such cannot be except in God, but a likeness
of some facet of the divine goodness. 35
To this doctrine of a creature's goodness through participa-

, I,

tion in the divine goodness st. Thomas adds a logical corollary:

,

the more closely a created substance resembles the divine goodness,

jactu. 1t
33C.G., III, 20.
3

.

4C•G., III, 64: uRes autem participant divinam bonitatem
lPer modum-similitudinis, inquantum ipsae suntbonae."
35Thomas says the same thing in S.T., I, 44, 4, ad 3; 105, 5
II-II, 23, 2, ad 1; C.G, I, '96; III, 24:

c~

,'

, ..,

the more it participates in goodness. 36

As a reason for this Thorn

aa says that the closer a being approximates its cause the more it
shares in the effect of that.cause. 37

It is necessary to under-

stand cause in the sense of exemplary cause.

The more a creature

is like the divine goodness the more it shares in that goodness.
Aquinas tells us, moreover, .that it is the intellectual creatures who most approximate God; for they come closest to God, Who
is a knowing and willing being.

"Now, among the superior crea-

tures, the closest to God are those rational ones that exist, live,
and understand in the likeness of God.

Consequently, God in His

goodness gives them the power not only of pouring out upon other
things but also of having the same manner of outpouring that He
Himself has--that is, according to their will, and not according
to any necessity of their nature."38

Man, because he is endowed

with free choice and understanding, more closely approximates the
divine essence than any other creature having matter in its essential make-up; for no other creature on earth has these divine
qualities.

In the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas says the same

36De Ver., 29, 5 c: "Unaquaeque autem substantia tanto a Deo
pleniuslbonitatem ejus participat, quanto ad ejus bonitatem appropinquat."
37C.G., III, 64, Item 2: "Quanto aliquid propinquius est
causae,-tanto plus participat de effectu ipsius."
38De Ver., 5, 8 c: "Inter superiores autem creaturas maxime
propinquae-sllnt Deo cre~turae rationales, quae ad Dei similitudinem sunt, vivunt, et intelligunt; unde eis non solum a divina bonitate confertur ut super alia influant, sed etlam ut eundem modum
influendi retineant quo influit Deus; scilicet per voluntatem, et
non er necessitatem naturae." (I 233.)

, It'
I

'.
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thing in substance but not quite so explicitly, for he is talking
of why it is fitting that there should be intellectual creatures.
Similitudo autem unius invenitur in altero dupliciter:
uno modo, quantum ad esse naturae, sicut similitudo caloris ignei est in re calefacta per ignem; alio modo,
secundum cognitionem, sicut similitudo ignis est in visu vel tactu. Ad hoc igitur quod similitudo Dei perfecte esset in rebus modis possibilibus, oportuit quod
divina bonitas rebus per similitudinem communicaretur
non solum in essendo, sed cognoscendo. Cognoscere autem
divinam bonitatem solus intellectus potest. Oportuit
igitur esse creaturas intellectuales. 39
superiority of intellectual creatures is shown here by the fac
t

these can possess a likeness of God not only in their act of

xistence according to their nature but also in knowing and understanding the goodness of the divinity according to their nature.
God also employs the higher creatures to communicate His good
ess to the creatures that participate the least in the divine
goodness by allowing the higher creatures to exercise a certain
amount of causality toward the lower beings.

"Similarly, in the.

ordering of the universe, as a result of the outpouring of God's
goodness, superior creatures have not only that by which they are
oodn in themselves, but also that by which they are the cause of
oodness for other things which participate
oodness."40

the least

in God's

Elsewhere in the De Veri tate St. Thomas affirms that

39C.G., II, 46, Item.
40De Ver., 5, 8 c (I, 233): "Unde et in ordine universi creturae supeFrores ex influentia divinae bonitatis habent non solum
od in seipsis bonae sint; sed etiam quod sint causae bonitatis
liorum 1 quae extremum modum participationis divinae bonitatis
bent.lt
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this communication of good to other creatures is the most noble
imitation of the divine goodness. 41

.

A creature's imitation of God

is most noble, then, when the creature imitates God's way of sharing His goodness with others.
Now, after the consideration of the degrees of participation
in the divine goodness, an investigation can be made into the ways
in which a creature participates in the divine goodness.

St. Thorn

as tells us that two aspects of a creature can be considered in
this regard:

(1) the species taken absolutely, and (2) the rela-

tion of the creature to its end. 42

Thomas states, furthermore,

that good is present in things according to both their substance
. and their ordination toward their end •. 43 In this study the creature's participation in good according to its substance will be
considered first.
This brings up a problem proposed to Boethius (A.D. 470-526)
that he endeavored to answer in a work often referred to as De
Hebdomadibus but more correctly entitled Quomodo Substantiae Bonae
Sint.

The problem is proposed in the form of a dilemma consider-

419 , 2 c: "Ex bonitate divina procedit quod ipse de perfectione sua creaturis communicet secundum earum proportionemj et
ideo non solum intantum communicat eis de sua bonitate, quod in se
sint bona et perfecta, sed etiam ut aliis perfectionem largiantur,
Deo quoddammodo cooperantej et hic est nobilissimus modus divinae
imitationis.tI
42 De Ver., 5, 1, ad 1: "In re creata cuo possunt considerari
scilicetspecies ejus absolute, et ordo ejus ad finem."
43S• T., I, 22, 1 c: "In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem
i e
et raeci ue finem ultimum."

,

,
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ing the arguments for and against saying that creatures are good
substantially.

If creatures are good substantially, they seem to

be identified with God ( or good in the same way as God) and this
would lead to pantheism; if creatures are good by participation,
it would seem that goodness is a mere accident consequent upon substance.

Boethius wrested with the problem, and St. Thomas ex-

plained Boethius' solution in his In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus
Expositio. 44

How well Thomas interpreted Boethius will not be

considered here; only the doctrine presented in the commentary is
to the purpose.
In the third Lectio of the Commentary 2£ the De Hebdomadibus
St. Thomas gets down to the problem itself.
its simplest terms:
cipation?45

First he states it in

Are beings good by their essences or by parti-

Thomas then points out that in this question it is

presupposed that to be by one's own substance and to be through
participation are direct OPPosites. 46

Next it is granted by Thom-

as that according to one of the types of participation, that by
which a subject participates in an accident or matter participates
in a form, this possession of a perfection by essence and through
participation would be directly opposed.

Because the form of the

44Ed. M. Calcaterra, O.P., in s. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula
Theologica (Turin, 1954), II, 391-408.
45In de Rebd., lect. 3, n. 43: "Est ergo quaestio utrum
entia sintbona per essentiam, vel per participationem."
46 Ibid ., n. 44: "Ad intel1ectum huius quaestionis considerandum est, quod in istaquaestione praesupponitur quod aliquid esse
InA)'> essentlam et~er participationem slnt opposlta."

accident is not contained within the nature, and the perfection of
a substantial form is not present in the uninformed matter, these
perfections cannot be predicated of their subjects in an essential
sense. 47
St. Thomas goes on to say, however, that in that type of participation in which species participates genus, there is true participation and at the same time the predication is substantial.
"But in the second mode of participation, namely that by which spe
cies participates in genus, it is true that the species participates in the genus.

This is also true in the opinion of Plato,

who held that the idea of animal was distinct from the idea of a
two-footed man.

But in the opinion of Aristotle, who held that

man actually is that which animal is (on the grounds that the essence of animal does not exist without the specific difference of
man), nothing stands in the way of the substantial predication of
something that is said to exist through participation. u48

If good

ere predicated of creatures in this way, they would participate

47 Ibid ., IIEt in uno quidem supradictorum participationis moorum manifeste verum est: scilicet secundum illum modum quo subiectum dicitur participare accidens, vel materia formam. Est enim
ccldens praeter naturam subiecti, et f'orma praeter ipsam subs tantiam materiae. lt
48 Ibid ., n. 45: USed in alio participationis modo, quo scilicet species participat genus, hoc verum est quod species participat genus. Boc etiam verum est secundum sententiam Platonis,
qui posuit aliam esse ideam animalis, et bipedinis hominis. Sed
secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui posuit quod homo vere est id
quod est animal, quasi essentia animalis non existente praeter
differentiam hominis; nihil prohibet, id quod per participationem
dici tur, substantiali ter praedicari. II

tiU

in goodness and at the same time possess it substantially, just as
man possesses the perfections of the notion of animal substantiallye

But Boethius takes participation to mean possess as an acci," I
I',

dent in the sense that man would participate in the accident of

I
,I

'f,

whiteness.

Therefore, it would necessarily follow that if crea-

tures are good by participation, they would not be good in themselves. 49

If it were true, then, that things are not good substan

tially, it would follow that they would not tend toward good; but
Boethius has already granted that creatures tend toward gOOd. 50
The other horn of the dilemma leads to the conclusion that if
creatures were substantial goods they would also be substantial
existences and thus they would be the first good, which is God. 51
Thomas gives the solution to this problem by saying that God,
the first good, has goodness of His own proper nature, which is
goodness itself.

Creatures do not have goodness by their nature

or essence, which is that of humanity or some such thing; but they
are good by virtue of the relationship of causality they have to

49 Ibid ., n. 47: "Sieut igitur Boetius hie accipit participationem, prout subiectum participat accidens; per se autem quod poniturOin definitione subiecti. Et sic ex necessitate sequitur
quod si res sint bonae per participationem, quod non sint bonae
per se."
50Ibid.
51Ibid., nne 48-51; in paragraph # 52 St. Thomas says: "Si
ergo omnia sunt ipsum primum bonum; cum ipsum primum bonum nihil
aliud sit quam Deus, sequitur quod omnia entia sunt Deus: quod
nefas est."

H
"

the first good, their first principle and last end.
Esse primi boni est secundum propriam rationem bonum,
quia natura et essentia primi boni nihil aliud est quam
bonitasj esse autem secundi boni est quidem bon~~, non
secundum rationem propriae essentiae, quia essentia
eius non est ipsa bonitas, sed vel humanitas, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodij sed esse eius habet quod sit bonum
ex habitudine ad primum bonum, quod est eius causa: ad
quod quidem comparatur sicut ad primum principium et ultimum finem; per modum quo aliquid dicitur sanum, quo
aliquid ordinatur ad finem sanitatisj ut dicitur medicinale secundum quod est a principio effectivo artis medicinae. 52
The participation which creatures enjoy in the divine goodness,
then, is the third type enumerated by St. Thomas in a preceding
lectio of the In Boetii De Hebdomadibus. 53
tion of effect in its cause.

This is the participa-

As God is the cause of goodness in

creatures, so the creature partiCipates through this causality in
the divine goodness.
It still remains to examine just how this goodness is present
in creatures.

St. Thomas tells us that it is present in the form

or essence, in the existence,. and in the accidents of creatures.
Goodness in a creature according to form and existence is called
the substantial goodness of the creature or goodness in a qualified sense, while the goodness present by virtue of the accidents
is known as absolute goodness.

itA creature is from God not only

in its essence but also in its act of existing, which constitutes

52 Ibid ., lect. 4, n. 62.
53 Lect • 2. The original Latin text is given above on page 29
of this study. This third type of participation, of course, is
the transcendental, cited above on page 32 and discussed on pages
41 and followln •
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the chief characteristic of substantial goodnessj and also in its
additional perfections, which constitute its absolute goodness.
These are not the "essence of the thing.

And furthermore, even the

relation by which the essence of the thing is referred to God as
its source is distinct from the easence."54
It seems rather surprising that the absolute goodness of a
creature is due to its accidental goodness.

As Thomas himself re-

marks, it is the other way around with existencej and one would
expect it to be the same with goodness. 55

As will be seen, the

reason for mants principal good being from his accidents is that
good is relative.
First of all, as has been said, goodness is present in the
creature according to form.

As already has been seen above,56

goodness is present in the creature in the inherent form which is
a likeness, the exemplary idea of which is contained in the divine
intellect as a possible participation in the divine goodness. 57
Secondly, goodness is present in the creature according to

54De Ver., 21, 5, ad 5 .(III, 27): "Creatura non solum est a
o secundum essentiam suam, sed secundum esse suum, in quo praecipue consistit ratio bonitatis substantialiSj et secundum perfectiones superadditas, in quibus consistit bonitas absoluta; et haec
non sunt essentia rei. Et praeterea ipse respectus quo essentia
rei refertur ad Deum ut ad principium, est aliud quam essentia."
55Ibid., 5 c: "De bono autem est e converso. Nam secundum
substantraIem bonitatem dicitur aliquld bonum secundum ~uidj sec
vero acc dentale dicitur allquid bonum simpliciter.
56pp. 59, 60, & 65.
57De Ver., 21, 4 c; S.T., I, 6, 4 c.
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its act of existence. 58

As has already been pointed out, St.

as held that in the act of existence a creature's substantial
ss is chiefly had.

"A creature is from God • • • in its act of

existing, which constitutes the chief characteristic of substantial goodness. u59 This is most reasonable, for being and good are
interchangeable, and accordingly the act of being must be good in
itself.

Moreover, the act of being is a likeness of the divine

goodness, which is being itself.
This substantial goodness, however, is called qualified goodness, or goodness in a certain sense.

The unqualified goodness or

absolute goodness that a creature has is his accidental goodness.
"From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is
said to be good in a certain sense, but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification.

Thus we

do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain sense
inasmuch as he is a man.
ther restriction. u60

But a just man we call good without fur-

This brings up the subject of accidental

58 It should be noted that in the Thomistic metaphysics, form
is distinct from existence. As Thomas puts it in the Compendium
Theologiae, "F'orma consequi tur esse, etai etiam non sit ipsum esse "
I, 111; ed. Verardo, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Theologica, I,
•
59De Ver., 21, 5, ad 5 (III, 27): "Creatura • • • est a Deo
• • • secundum esse suum in quo praecipue consistit ratio bonitati
substantialis. 1t
60Ibid., c (III, 25): "Nam secundum Bubstantialem bonitatem
dicitur-aIrquid bonum secundum quid, secundum vero accidentalem
dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter; unde hominem injustum non dicimus bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum est homo;
hominem vero justum dicimus simpliciter bonum."
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good in man and his ordination to God the Creator.
The reason why a creature is not called good in an absolute

.

sense except by virtue of his accidental perfections is that goodness is had with respect to others and a creature is in perfect
harmony with other things through accidents.

For the creature's

operations are had by means of powers distinct from the essence. 6l
A creature's perfection, then, is attained through the operation
of its powers by which accidental perfections accrue to the individual.

The absolute perfection of the creature is had through the

accidents and not the essence or nature. 62
The creature in both its constituent and accidental principles is directed to God as to its last end.

"Now things are di-

rected to the ultimate end intended by God, the divine goodness to
wit, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that
they exist:

because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness

to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things."63

All

61Ibid ., "Nam unumquodque dicitur esse ens in quantum absolute consideratur; bonum vero • • • secundum respectum ad alia. In
seipso autem aliquid perficitur ut sUbsistat per essentialia principia; sed ut debito modo se habeat ad omnia quae sunt extra ipsum,
on perficitur nisi mediantibus accidentibus superadditis essentiae
quia operationes quibus unum alteri conjungitur ab essentia mediantibus virtutibus essentiae superadditis progrediuntur."
62 Ibid ., ad 5.
63C•G., III, 65 (III, 155): "In finem autem ultimum quem Deus
intendit,-scilicet bonitatem·divinam, ordinantur res non solum per
oc quod operantur, sed etiam per hoc quod sunt; quia inquantum
sunt, divinae bonitatis similitudinem gerunt, quod est finis
rerum. II This citation is from the beginning of this rather lengthly article; in the Leonine manual edition it is found on page 297b.
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creatures, both inasmuch as they are and inasmuch as they operate
through powers distinct from their sUbstantial existences, tend to
become like or to be assimilated to the divine goodness.

Two pas-

sages from the Summa Contra Gentiles illustrate this point.
Praeterea. Res orones creatae sunt quaedam imagines
primi agentis, scilicet Del: agens enim agit sibi simile. Perfectio autem imaginis est ut repraesentet auum
exemplar per similitudinem ad ipsum: ad hoc enim imago
constltuitur. Sunt igitur res Omnes propter divinam
similitudinem consequendam sicut propter ultimum finem.
Adhuc. Omnis res per suum motum vel actionem tendit in aliquod bonum sicut in finem. • ••
In tanturo
autem aliquid de bono participat, in quantum assimila.tur primae bonitati, quae Deus est. Omnia igitur per
motus suos et actionem tendunt in divinam similitudinem
sicut in finem ultimum. 64
Thus, it is not only proper to a creature to be a likeness of the
divine goodness, but also, inasmuch as it is possible, to become
more like God, the infinite good.
This attraction of all things to the divine goodness extends
even to prime matter, according to Aquinas.

Good that is predica-

ted of prime matter is not to be called merely potential good; but
inasmuch as it is ordained to good can the matter be called good
(by the very fact of that ordination).

Another reason for saying

that prime matter can be called good is that prime matter has a
tendency

to~ard

being and therefore toward good.

Because only

lilre things seek like things, the prime matter must be Bood.
Et licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum est ens, non
tamen oportet quod materia, quae est ens solum in poten-

64III, 19.
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tia, sit bonum in potentia. Ens enim absolute dicitur,
bonum autem etiam in ordine conaistit: non enim solum
aliquid bonum dicitur quia est finis, vel quia est obtinens finem; s~d, etiam si nondum ad finem pervenerit, dummodo sit ordinatum in finem ex hoc ipso dicitur bonum.
Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc quod
est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse: potest
autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ipsum.
• ••
Nam et ipsa non existentia, scilicet materia secundum quod intelligitur privationi subiecta, appetit
bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona:
nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum. 55
The goodness of God, then, reaches to the lowliest on the Thomisti
ladder of being, to prime matter.

A final consideration of the Thomistic theory of the participation of creatures in good is Aquinas' interpretation of the say. ing of Dionysius, "Bonum est diffusivum sui et ~."66
tum has been translated thus:
existence.,,67

This dic-

"Good tends to pour out itself and

Thomas says that, although the word to pour out

generally indicates the operation of an efficient cause, it can
still be taken in a broad sense to mean to influence, to make, and
the like, and thus indicate the operation of any cause.

In the

saying, "Good tends to pour out itself and existence," Thomas
have the diffusive quality of pouring out indicate the operof a final cause, because a being is dependent upon ita fi1 cause in its whole existence whereas the efficient cause is

t the measure of the thing but only its beginning and also the

65 C .G., III, 20.

66 De Ver., 21, 1, ad 4.

67Truth, III, pp. 3-4.

'd'l

effect shares or participates in the efficient cause only as in an
assimilation of its form.
[p]iffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen
largo modo potest importare habitudinem cujuscumque causae sicut influere et facere, et alia hujusmod1. Cum
autem dicitur quod bonum est diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda ef1'usio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod
importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio n
non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita.
Dicit autem bonum difi'usionem causae finalis, et
non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, in quantum hujusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis initiumj tum quia effectus participat causam efficientem
secundum assimilationem formae tantumj sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni. 68
Therefore, since the act of being of the creature is influenced in
its constitution and operations by its ultimate end, which is the
greatest good or the divine goodness, and the creature is ever
imitating this goodness in the essential and accidental perfections of the creature, goodness is to be understood as pouring itself out according to the operations of final causality.
Thus is it seen that all creatures in their entirety--matter,
form, accidents, and existence--are dependent upon the divine
goodness and participate in its perfections through its exemplary,
efficient, and final causality.

68

~

Ver., 21, 1, ad 4.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
When something is said to be good, it is meant that the thing
s something which is desireable not only to others but also to
The gazelle roaming the jungles and plains of Africa ofers a great attraction to the appetite of the hungry lion, it is
true; but the gazelle's own existence is a good to itself, so much
so that it will make use of every means possible to take flight
from the lion and preserve its own existence.
The good thing, then, is that which creates a tendency toward
itself in others and in itself.
conveys the idea of end.

Thus the notion of good always

This concept of good and its concomitant

concept of end is interchangeable with the concept of being inasmuch as every being has some reference to existence which in itse
is desireable and consequently a good.
But where does the good thing get that by which it can be
called good?

What is the source of the goodness of any being?

St

Thomas' fourth proof for the existence of God tells us that God,
in Whom are all the perfections of creation in their greatest perfection, is the cause of all the goodness which is to be found in
creatures. l
There is something about the idea of good, however, which,

IS.T., I, 2, 3 c, quarta via
88
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sychologically speaking, makes it more attractive than any of the
other divine perfegtions.

A man is more interested in a thing if

he knows that the thing is good than if he knows that it exists,
or that it is one, or even true.

The goodness of his home means

re to him than its existence, oneness, or its truth.

And the

his house, like the goodness of any creature, is due
Itimately to the goodness of God, the source of all goodness; for
the ultimate reason why anything can be said to be good is that it
participates in the goodness of God through the causality of God,
hich constitutes the creature in goodness and preserves it in the
same.
This participation is always had through a likeness of the
divine goodness.

For every good thing is a model of the divine

goodness, not an exact model because such would be the divine
goodness and consequently there would be two supreme beings, which
is impossible.

But each being portrays some facet of the divine

essence and its goodness is a likeness of some aspect of the divine goodness.
Of all the creatures on the face of the earth, man is the
highest because he possesses the divine qualities of intellection
and free choice.

And man by the proper use of these qualities can

most nearly imitate the goodness of God by commtmicating goodness
to the lower creatures on earth.
Thus there is a hierarchy of goods that extends from the lowentity on the Thomistic scale of being--prime matter--up through
and the

and final

to the hi

est
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which is the divine goodness itself; and all of these beings receive their goodness from God by imitating some aspect of His divine essence.
What deserves stress in this doctrine of participation of
creatures in good is the active or dynamic side of the metaphysical reality.

Participation of creatures in good should not be con-

ceived of as so many creatures holding on to SOme good thing, as
forty children in a classroom holding on to lollipops received for
good recitations.

Participation in good should be thought of as a

continual receiving of a stream of gifts from the author of all
goodness.
Not the least part of the dynamic side of participation in
good is the attraction of all creatures to the goodness of God as
to their last end.

God is the gigantic loadstone attracting all

beings to Himself, because every being that seeks another and
tends to it as a good, does so because the real or supposed good
appears as a likeness of some aspect of the divine gOOdness.

This

special attraction of man to God has been enshrined most beautifully in the language of man by St. Augustine, who says to God, ItFor
Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until
they rest in Thee. 1t2

2

Confessiones, Liber Ij translated by F.J. Sheed,
sions of Saint Augustine, (New York, 1942), p. 3.

~

Confes-
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